Поиск префикса BGP
Введите префикс (или отдельный адрес). Ответ из нашей ежедневной копии глобальной таблицы маршрутизации.
116.6.0.0/16
Анонсирован точно
- 116.6.0.0/16AS4809China Telecom Next Generation Carrier NetworkRPKI Действителен116.6.0.0
- Регистратура
- APNIC · Китай · 7 мар. 2007 г.
- Выделенный блок
- 116.4.0.0 – 116.7.255.255
Покрывающие маршруты
- 116.4.0.0/14AS4134No.31,Jin-rong StreetRPKI Не найдено116.4.0.0
Более специфичные маршруты
- 116.6.1.0/24AS136199CHINANET Guangdong province Yuedong MAN networkRPKI Действителен116.6.1.0
- 116.6.6.0/24AS140311CHINATELECOM Guangdong province Jiangmen 5G networkRPKI Действителен116.6.6.0
- 116.6.7.0/24AS4809China Telecom Next Generation Carrier NetworkRPKI Действителен116.6.7.0
- 116.6.27.0/24AS140319CHINATELECOM Guangdong province Qingyuan 5G networkRPKI Действителен116.6.27.0
- 116.6.30.0/23AS4809China Telecom Next Generation Carrier NetworkRPKI Действителен116.6.30.0
- 116.6.36.0/23AS136199CHINANET Guangdong province Yuedong MAN networkRPKI Действителен116.6.36.0
- 116.6.38.0/23AS140308CHINATELECOM Guangdong province Zhuhai 5G networkRPKI Действителен116.6.38.0
- 116.6.48.0/23AS4809China Telecom Next Generation Carrier NetworkRPKI Действителен116.6.48.0
- 116.6.80.0/24AS140318CHINATELECOM Guangdong province Heyuan 5G networkRPKI Недействителен116.6.80.0
- 116.6.83.0/24AS136199CHINANET Guangdong province Yuedong MAN networkRPKI Действителен116.6.83.0
- 116.6.93.0/24AS4809China Telecom Next Generation Carrier NetworkRPKI Действителен116.6.93.0
- 116.6.112.0/22AS4809China Telecom Next Generation Carrier NetworkRPKI Действителен116.6.112.0
- 116.6.142.0/24AS4809China Telecom Next Generation Carrier NetworkRPKI Действителен116.6.142.0
- 116.6.204.0/22AS4809China Telecom Next Generation Carrier NetworkRPKI Действителен116.6.204.0
Этот текст пока недоступен на языке «русский». До публикации перевода он показан на языке «английский».
On the internet, routes are announced as prefixes: an autonomous system tells its neighbours via BGP that it can deliver traffic for, say, 144.122.0.0/16 (Middle East Technical University, AS1967). This tool looks a prefix up in our daily copy of the global routing table and shows three things:
- Exact announcements: which AS originates exactly this prefix. More than one origin (a MOAS) is normal for anycast services and some multihomed networks, and suspicious otherwise.
- Covering routes: less-specific announcements that contain it. Traffic follows the most specific route, so a covering route matters if the more-specific one disappears.
- More-specifics: announcements inside it, which may belong to other networks (customers, or a hijack).
Each announced route is also checked against the RPKI: whether a ROA authorises its origin AS.
The table is the view from APNIC’s route collector. Most of the global table is the same from everywhere, but a route that is filtered before it reaches that collector will not appear.
Частые вопросы
Why is my /24 not listed but a /16 is?
Your addresses are announced as part of the larger block, and no one announces the /24 separately. That is the normal case for most customers of a provider.
What is a more-specific hijack?
Someone announces a longer prefix inside your space. Because routers prefer the most specific route, traffic goes to them. RPKI with a strict max length makes such announcements invalid.
Can I enter a single address?
Yes. The tool then shows the most specific announced route that contains it.
См. также
- Проверка маршрута RPKIАвторизована ли исходная AS маршрута в ROA?
- Поиск ASNВладелец, регистратура и все префиксы, которые анонсирует AS.
- Поиск по IPASN, провайдер, маршрут, обратный DNS и местоположение любого адреса.
- Калькулятор CIDRСеть, широковещательный адрес, маски и число хостов для любого префикса.