Поиск префикса BGP

Введите префикс (или отдельный адрес). Ответ из нашей ежедневной копии глобальной таблицы маршрутизации.

Примеры:

168.143.0.0/16

Взгляд одного коллектора (APNIC). Маршрут, отфильтрованный до него, не показывается.

Анонсирован точно

168.143.0.0/16AS2914NTT America, Inc.RPKI Действителен168.143.0.0

Регистратура: ARIN · Соединенные Штаты · 13 мая 1994 г.
Выделенный блок: 168.143.0.0 – 168.143.255.255

Покрывающие маршруты

Его не покрывает ни один менее специфичный маршрут.

Более специфичные маршруты

Более специфичных: 18 от исходных AS: 8

168.143.0.0/18AS6079RCNRPKI Действителен168.143.0.0
168.143.80.0/20AS203020HostRoyale Technologies Pvt LtdRPKI Действителен168.143.80.0
168.143.96.0/24AS13700NexusWaveRPKI Действителен168.143.96.0
168.143.111.0/24AS13700NexusWaveRPKI Действителен168.143.111.0
168.143.116.0/24AS148996GLOBAL COMMUNICATION NETWORK LIMITEDRPKI Действителен168.143.116.0
168.143.117.0/24AS148996GLOBAL COMMUNICATION NETWORK LIMITEDRPKI Действителен168.143.117.0
168.143.118.0/24AS148996GLOBAL COMMUNICATION NETWORK LIMITEDRPKI Действителен168.143.118.0
168.143.119.0/24AS214432Zhilian Technology CO., LTD.RPKI Действителен168.143.119.0
168.143.160.0/20AS203020HostRoyale Technologies Pvt LtdRPKI Действителен168.143.160.0
168.143.160.0/24AS203020HostRoyale Technologies Pvt LtdRPKI Действителен168.143.160.0
168.143.161.0/24AS203020HostRoyale Technologies Pvt LtdRPKI Действителен168.143.161.0
168.143.162.0/23AS203020HostRoyale Technologies Pvt LtdRPKI Действителен168.143.162.0
168.143.164.0/22AS203020HostRoyale Technologies Pvt LtdRPKI Действителен168.143.164.0
168.143.168.0/21AS203020HostRoyale Technologies Pvt LtdRPKI Действителен168.143.168.0
168.143.179.0/24AS204670NTT United Kingdom LtdRPKI Действителен168.143.179.0
168.143.192.0/19AS203020HostRoyale Technologies Pvt LtdRPKI Действителен168.143.192.0
168.143.236.0/24AS174Cogent Communications, LLCRPKI Действителен168.143.236.0
168.143.242.0/23AS20940Akamai International B.V.RPKI Действителен168.143.242.0

Этот текст пока недоступен на языке «русский». До публикации перевода он показан на языке «английский».

On the internet, routes are announced as prefixes: an autonomous system tells its neighbours via BGP that it can deliver traffic for, say, 144.122.0.0/16 (Middle East Technical University, AS1967). This tool looks a prefix up in our daily copy of the global routing table and shows three things:

Exact announcements: which AS originates exactly this prefix. More than one origin (a MOAS) is normal for anycast services and some multihomed networks, and suspicious otherwise.
Covering routes: less-specific announcements that contain it. Traffic follows the most specific route, so a covering route matters if the more-specific one disappears.
More-specifics: announcements inside it, which may belong to other networks (customers, or a hijack).

Each announced route is also checked against the RPKI: whether a ROA authorises its origin AS.

The table is the view from APNIC’s route collector. Most of the global table is the same from everywhere, but a route that is filtered before it reaches that collector will not appear.

Частые вопросы

Why is my /24 not listed but a /16 is?

Your addresses are announced as part of the larger block, and no one announces the /24 separately. That is the normal case for most customers of a provider.

What is a more-specific hijack?

Someone announces a longer prefix inside your space. Because routers prefer the most specific route, traffic goes to them. RPKI with a strict max length makes such announcements invalid.

Can I enter a single address?

Yes. The tool then shows the most specific announced route that contains it.

Частые вопросы

См. также