البحث عن بادئة BGP
أدخل بادئة (أو عنواناً واحداً). يُجاب من نسختنا اليومية من جدول التوجيه العالمي.
14.144.0.0/12
معلنة كما هي
- 14.144.0.0/12AS4134No.31,Jin-rong StreetRPKI غير مُغطّى14.144.0.0
- السجل
- APNIC · الصين · 06/09/2010
- الكتلة المفوَّضة
- 14.144.0.0 – 14.159.255.255
المسارات المغطّية
لا يغطيها أي مسار أقل تحديداً.
المسارات الأكثر تحديداً
- 14.144.0.0/18AS140318CHINATELECOM Guangdong province Heyuan 5G networkRPKI غير مُغطّى14.144.0.0
- 14.144.64.0/18AS140320CHINATELECOM Guangdong province Shanwei 5G networkRPKI صالح14.144.64.0
- 14.146.224.0/22AS135089China TelecomRPKI صالح14.146.224.0
- 14.146.228.0/22AS135089China TelecomRPKI صالح14.146.228.0
- 14.147.216.0/24AS140308CHINATELECOM Guangdong province Zhuhai 5G networkRPKI صالح14.147.216.0
- 14.148.32.0/20AS136199CHINANET Guangdong province Yuedong MAN networkRPKI صالح14.148.32.0
- 14.148.48.0/20AS140308CHINATELECOM Guangdong province Zhuhai 5G networkRPKI صالح14.148.48.0
- 14.148.64.0/21AS140309CHINATELECOM Guangdong province Zhongshan 5G networkRPKI غير مُغطّى14.148.64.0
- 14.148.80.0/21AS140311CHINATELECOM Guangdong province Jiangmen 5G networkRPKI صالح14.148.80.0
- 14.148.144.0/21AS140318CHINATELECOM Guangdong province Heyuan 5G networkRPKI غير مُغطّى14.148.144.0
- 14.148.152.0/21AS140319CHINATELECOM Guangdong province Qingyuan 5G networkRPKI صالح14.148.152.0
- 14.148.160.0/21AS140320CHINATELECOM Guangdong province Shanwei 5G networkRPKI صالح14.148.160.0
- 14.149.64.0/21AS140318CHINATELECOM Guangdong province Heyuan 5G networkRPKI غير مُغطّى14.149.64.0
- 14.149.128.0/18AS140319CHINATELECOM Guangdong province Qingyuan 5G networkRPKI صالح14.149.128.0
- 14.152.80.0/20AS134763CHINANET Guangdong province networkRPKI صالح14.152.80.0
هذا النص غير متوفر بعد باللغة العربية. يُعرض باللغة الإنجليزية إلى أن تُنشر ترجمة.
On the internet, routes are announced as prefixes: an autonomous system tells its neighbours via BGP that it can deliver traffic for, say, 144.122.0.0/16 (Middle East Technical University, AS1967). This tool looks a prefix up in our daily copy of the global routing table and shows three things:
- Exact announcements: which AS originates exactly this prefix. More than one origin (a MOAS) is normal for anycast services and some multihomed networks, and suspicious otherwise.
- Covering routes: less-specific announcements that contain it. Traffic follows the most specific route, so a covering route matters if the more-specific one disappears.
- More-specifics: announcements inside it, which may belong to other networks (customers, or a hijack).
Each announced route is also checked against the RPKI: whether a ROA authorises its origin AS.
The table is the view from APNIC’s route collector. Most of the global table is the same from everywhere, but a route that is filtered before it reaches that collector will not appear.
الأسئلة الشائعة
Why is my /24 not listed but a /16 is?
Your addresses are announced as part of the larger block, and no one announces the /24 separately. That is the normal case for most customers of a provider.
What is a more-specific hijack?
Someone announces a longer prefix inside your space. Because routers prefer the most specific route, traffic goes to them. RPKI with a strict max length makes such announcements invalid.
Can I enter a single address?
Yes. The tool then shows the most specific announced route that contains it.