البحث عن بادئة BGP
أدخل بادئة (أو عنواناً واحداً). يُجاب من نسختنا اليومية من جدول التوجيه العالمي.
213.169.192.0/18
معلنة كما هي
- 213.169.192.0/18AS3257GTT Communications Inc.RPKI غير مُغطّى213.169.192.0
- السجل
- RIPE NCC · الولايات المتحدة · 04/05/2000
- الكتلة المفوَّضة
- 213.169.192.0 – 213.169.223.255
المسارات المغطّية
لا يغطيها أي مسار أقل تحديداً.
المسارات الأكثر تحديداً
- 213.169.192.0/23AS3356Level 3 Parent, LLCRPKI صالح213.169.192.0
- 213.169.194.0/23AS3320Deutsche Telekom AGRPKI صالح213.169.194.0
- 213.169.196.0/23AS2856British Telecommunications LimitedRPKI صالح213.169.196.0
- 213.169.198.0/23AS55470Cyfuture India Pvt. Ltd.RPKI صالح213.169.198.0
- 213.169.200.0/23AS35758Rachamim Aviel TwitoRPKI صالح213.169.200.0
- 213.169.202.0/23AS2856British Telecommunications LimitedRPKI صالح213.169.202.0
- 213.169.204.0/23AS9009M247 Europe SRLRPKI صالح213.169.204.0
- 213.169.206.0/23AS212238Datacamp LimitedRPKI صالح213.169.206.0
- 213.169.208.0/22AS30058FDCservers.netRPKI صالح213.169.208.0
- 213.169.212.0/22AS30058FDCservers.netRPKI صالح213.169.212.0
- 213.169.216.0/23AS30058FDCservers.netRPKI صالح213.169.216.0
- 213.169.219.0/24AS201201UAB Delska LithuaniaRPKI صالح213.169.219.0
- 213.169.220.0/24AS19211HostingYard LLCRPKI صالح213.169.220.0
- 213.169.221.0/24AS19211HostingYard LLCRPKI صالح213.169.221.0
- 213.169.222.0/24AS19211HostingYard LLCRPKI صالح213.169.222.0
- 213.169.223.0/24AS19211HostingYard LLCRPKI صالح213.169.223.0
- 213.169.224.0/23AS30058FDCservers.netRPKI صالح213.169.224.0
- 213.169.226.0/23AS59711HZ Hosting LtdRPKI صالح213.169.226.0
- 213.169.228.0/23AS30058FDCservers.netRPKI صالح213.169.228.0
- 213.169.230.0/23AS30058FDCservers.netRPKI صالح213.169.230.0
- 213.169.238.0/23AS55470Cyfuture India Pvt. Ltd.RPKI صالح213.169.238.0
- 213.169.240.0/23AS9009M247 Europe SRLRPKI صالح213.169.240.0
- 213.169.242.0/23AS55470Cyfuture India Pvt. Ltd.RPKI صالح213.169.242.0
- 213.169.244.0/23AS59711HZ Hosting LtdRPKI صالح213.169.244.0
- 213.169.246.0/23AS30058FDCservers.netRPKI صالح213.169.246.0
- 213.169.248.0/23AS3320Deutsche Telekom AGRPKI صالح213.169.248.0
- 213.169.250.0/23AS30058FDCservers.netRPKI صالح213.169.250.0
- 213.169.252.0/23AS30058FDCservers.netRPKI صالح213.169.252.0
- 213.169.254.0/23AS3320Deutsche Telekom AGRPKI صالح213.169.254.0
هذا النص غير متوفر بعد باللغة العربية. يُعرض باللغة الإنجليزية إلى أن تُنشر ترجمة.
On the internet, routes are announced as prefixes: an autonomous system tells its neighbours via BGP that it can deliver traffic for, say, 144.122.0.0/16 (Middle East Technical University, AS1967). This tool looks a prefix up in our daily copy of the global routing table and shows three things:
- Exact announcements: which AS originates exactly this prefix. More than one origin (a MOAS) is normal for anycast services and some multihomed networks, and suspicious otherwise.
- Covering routes: less-specific announcements that contain it. Traffic follows the most specific route, so a covering route matters if the more-specific one disappears.
- More-specifics: announcements inside it, which may belong to other networks (customers, or a hijack).
Each announced route is also checked against the RPKI: whether a ROA authorises its origin AS.
The table is the view from APNIC’s route collector. Most of the global table is the same from everywhere, but a route that is filtered before it reaches that collector will not appear.
الأسئلة الشائعة
Why is my /24 not listed but a /16 is?
Your addresses are announced as part of the larger block, and no one announces the /24 separately. That is the normal case for most customers of a provider.
What is a more-specific hijack?
Someone announces a longer prefix inside your space. Because routers prefer the most specific route, traffic goes to them. RPKI with a strict max length makes such announcements invalid.
Can I enter a single address?
Yes. The tool then shows the most specific announced route that contains it.