البحث عن بادئة BGP
أدخل بادئة (أو عنواناً واحداً). يُجاب من نسختنا اليومية من جدول التوجيه العالمي.
27.148.0.0/14
معلنة كما هي
- 27.148.0.0/14AS4134No.31,Jin-rong StreetRPKI صالح27.148.0.0
- السجل
- APNIC · الصين · 26/03/2010
- الكتلة المفوَّضة
- 27.148.0.0 – 27.151.255.255
المسارات المغطّية
لا يغطيها أي مسار أقل تحديداً.
المسارات الأكثر تحديداً
- 27.148.22.0/24AS4809China Telecom Next Generation Carrier NetworkRPKI صالح27.148.22.0
- 27.148.23.0/24AS4809China Telecom Next Generation Carrier NetworkRPKI صالح27.148.23.0
- 27.148.128.0/20AS133774FuzhouRPKI صالح27.148.128.0
- 27.148.144.0/21AS133774FuzhouRPKI صالح27.148.144.0
- 27.148.149.0/24AS133774FuzhouRPKI صالح27.148.149.0
- 27.148.152.0/21AS133774FuzhouRPKI صالح27.148.152.0
- 27.148.152.0/24AS133774FuzhouRPKI صالح27.148.152.0
- 27.148.153.0/24AS133774FuzhouRPKI صالح27.148.153.0
- 27.148.196.0/22AS133774FuzhouRPKI صالح27.148.196.0
- 27.148.200.0/23AS133774FuzhouRPKI صالح27.148.200.0
- 27.148.202.0/24AS133774FuzhouRPKI صالح27.148.202.0
- 27.148.205.0/24AS133774FuzhouRPKI صالح27.148.205.0
- 27.148.206.0/23AS133774FuzhouRPKI صالح27.148.206.0
- 27.148.208.0/21AS133774FuzhouRPKI صالح27.148.208.0
- 27.148.248.0/21AS4809China Telecom Next Generation Carrier NetworkRPKI صالح27.148.248.0
- 27.150.16.0/20AS133774FuzhouRPKI صالح27.150.16.0
- 27.150.128.0/21AS133776QuanzhouRPKI صالح27.150.128.0
- 27.150.136.0/23AS133776QuanzhouRPKI صالح27.150.136.0
- 27.150.168.0/21AS133774FuzhouRPKI صالح27.150.168.0
- 27.150.180.0/22AS133774FuzhouRPKI صالح27.150.180.0
- 27.150.182.0/24AS133774FuzhouRPKI صالح27.150.182.0
- 27.150.184.0/22AS133774FuzhouRPKI صالح27.150.184.0
- 27.150.188.0/24AS133774FuzhouRPKI صالح27.150.188.0
- 27.150.189.0/24AS133774FuzhouRPKI صالح27.150.189.0
- 27.150.190.0/24AS133774FuzhouRPKI صالح27.150.190.0
- 27.151.0.0/19AS133774FuzhouRPKI صالح27.151.0.0
- 27.151.3.0/24AS133774FuzhouRPKI صالح27.151.3.0
- 27.151.4.0/22AS133774FuzhouRPKI صالح27.151.4.0
- 27.151.8.0/23AS133774FuzhouRPKI صالح27.151.8.0
- 27.151.13.0/24AS133774FuzhouRPKI صالح27.151.13.0
هذا النص غير متوفر بعد باللغة العربية. يُعرض باللغة الإنجليزية إلى أن تُنشر ترجمة.
On the internet, routes are announced as prefixes: an autonomous system tells its neighbours via BGP that it can deliver traffic for, say, 144.122.0.0/16 (Middle East Technical University, AS1967). This tool looks a prefix up in our daily copy of the global routing table and shows three things:
- Exact announcements: which AS originates exactly this prefix. More than one origin (a MOAS) is normal for anycast services and some multihomed networks, and suspicious otherwise.
- Covering routes: less-specific announcements that contain it. Traffic follows the most specific route, so a covering route matters if the more-specific one disappears.
- More-specifics: announcements inside it, which may belong to other networks (customers, or a hijack).
Each announced route is also checked against the RPKI: whether a ROA authorises its origin AS.
The table is the view from APNIC’s route collector. Most of the global table is the same from everywhere, but a route that is filtered before it reaches that collector will not appear.
الأسئلة الشائعة
Why is my /24 not listed but a /16 is?
Your addresses are announced as part of the larger block, and no one announces the /24 separately. That is the normal case for most customers of a provider.
What is a more-specific hijack?
Someone announces a longer prefix inside your space. Because routers prefer the most specific route, traffic goes to them. RPKI with a strict max length makes such announcements invalid.
Can I enter a single address?
Yes. The tool then shows the most specific announced route that contains it.