جستوجوی پیشوند BGP
یک پیشوند (یا یک نشانی) وارد کنید. از نسخهٔ روزانهٔ ما از جدول جهانی مسیریابی پاسخ داده میشود.
2001:918::/32
دقیقاً اعلامشده
- 2001:918::/32AS3303Swisscom (Schweiz) AGRPKI معتبر2001:918::
- ثبتکننده
- RIPE NCC · سوئیس · ۵ مهر ۱۳۸۱
- بلوک واگذارشده
- 2001:918:: – 2001:91f:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff
مسیرهای پوشاننده
هیچ مسیر کلیتری آن را نمیپوشاند.
مسیرهای جزئیتر
- 2001:918:1ab::/48AS8300Swisscom (Schweiz) AGRPKI معتبر2001:918:1ab::
- 2001:918:f00::/40AS8300Swisscom (Schweiz) AGRPKI معتبر2001:918:f00::
- 2001:918:ff16::/48AS21273Swisscom (Schweiz) AGRPKI معتبر2001:918:ff16::
- 2001:918:ff22::/48AS21273Swisscom (Schweiz) AGRPKI معتبر2001:918:ff22::
- 2001:918:ff3e::/48AS48038Coop GenossenschaftRPKI معتبر2001:918:ff3e::
- 2001:918:ff44::/48AS3303Swisscom (Schweiz) AGRPKI معتبر2001:918:ff44::
- 2001:918:ff5d::/48AS15398Werft22 AGRPKI معتبر2001:918:ff5d::
- 2001:918:ff64::/48AS3303Swisscom (Schweiz) AGRPKI معتبر2001:918:ff64::
- 2001:918:ffa9::/48AS3303Swisscom (Schweiz) AGRPKI معتبر2001:918:ffa9::
- 2001:918:ffaa::/48AS3303Swisscom (Schweiz) AGRPKI معتبر2001:918:ffaa::
- 2001:918:ffac::/48AS3303Swisscom (Schweiz) AGRPKI معتبر2001:918:ffac::
- 2001:918:ffad::/48AS3303Swisscom (Schweiz) AGRPKI معتبر2001:918:ffad::
- 2001:918:ffb7::/48AS8300Swisscom (Schweiz) AGRPKI معتبر2001:918:ffb7::
- 2001:918:ffcb::/48AS3303Swisscom (Schweiz) AGRPKI معتبر2001:918:ffcb::
- 2001:918:fff2::/48AS208813Galexis AGRPKI معتبر2001:918:fff2::
- 2001:918:fff9::/48AS3303Swisscom (Schweiz) AGRPKI معتبر2001:918:fff9::
- 2001:918:fffa::/48AS3303Swisscom (Schweiz) AGRPKI معتبر2001:918:fffa::
این متن هنوز به فارسی در دسترس نیست. تا انتشار ترجمه به انگلیسی نمایش داده میشود.
On the internet, routes are announced as prefixes: an autonomous system tells its neighbours via BGP that it can deliver traffic for, say, 144.122.0.0/16 (Middle East Technical University, AS1967). This tool looks a prefix up in our daily copy of the global routing table and shows three things:
- Exact announcements: which AS originates exactly this prefix. More than one origin (a MOAS) is normal for anycast services and some multihomed networks, and suspicious otherwise.
- Covering routes: less-specific announcements that contain it. Traffic follows the most specific route, so a covering route matters if the more-specific one disappears.
- More-specifics: announcements inside it, which may belong to other networks (customers, or a hijack).
Each announced route is also checked against the RPKI: whether a ROA authorises its origin AS.
The table is the view from APNIC’s route collector. Most of the global table is the same from everywhere, but a route that is filtered before it reaches that collector will not appear.
پرسشهای پرتکرار
Why is my /24 not listed but a /16 is?
Your addresses are announced as part of the larger block, and no one announces the /24 separately. That is the normal case for most customers of a provider.
What is a more-specific hijack?
Someone announces a longer prefix inside your space. Because routers prefer the most specific route, traffic goes to them. RPKI with a strict max length makes such announcements invalid.
Can I enter a single address?
Yes. The tool then shows the most specific announced route that contains it.