جستوجوی پیشوند BGP
یک پیشوند (یا یک نشانی) وارد کنید. از نسخهٔ روزانهٔ ما از جدول جهانی مسیریابی پاسخ داده میشود.
210.179.0.0/16
دقیقاً اعلامشده
- 210.179.0.0/16AS4766Korea TelecomRPKI بدون ROA210.179.0.0
- ثبتکننده
- APNIC · کرهٔ جنوبی · ۳ آذر ۱۳۷۷
- بلوک واگذارشده
- 210.178.0.0 – 210.179.255.255
مسیرهای پوشاننده
هیچ مسیر کلیتری آن را نمیپوشاند.
مسیرهای جزئیتر
- 210.179.0.0/21AS4766Korea TelecomRPKI بدون ROA210.179.0.0
- 210.179.40.128/25AS4766Korea TelecomRPKI بدون ROA210.179.40.128
- 210.179.87.0/24AS45400Korea TelecomRPKI بدون ROA210.179.87.0
- 210.179.88.0/24AS45400Korea TelecomRPKI بدون ROA210.179.88.0
- 210.179.139.128/25AS45400Korea TelecomRPKI بدون ROA210.179.139.128
- 210.179.140.0/24AS45400Korea TelecomRPKI بدون ROA210.179.140.0
- 210.179.141.0/24AS45400Korea TelecomRPKI بدون ROA210.179.141.0
- 210.179.148.0/24AS17841NATIONAL INFORMATION RESOURCES SERVICERPKI بدون ROA210.179.148.0
- 210.179.159.0/24AS45400Korea TelecomRPKI بدون ROA210.179.159.0
- 210.179.176.0/24AS4766Korea TelecomRPKI بدون ROA210.179.176.0
- 210.179.177.0/25AS45400Korea TelecomRPKI بدون ROA210.179.177.0
- 210.179.185.0/24AS4766Korea TelecomRPKI بدون ROA210.179.185.0
- 210.179.205.0/24AS17841NATIONAL INFORMATION RESOURCES SERVICERPKI بدون ROA210.179.205.0
- 210.179.218.0/24AS45400Korea TelecomRPKI بدون ROA210.179.218.0
- 210.179.219.0/24AS45400Korea TelecomRPKI بدون ROA210.179.219.0
- 210.179.230.0/24AS10039Korea Health Industry Development InstituteRPKI بدون ROA210.179.230.0
- 210.179.231.0/24AS10039Korea Health Industry Development InstituteRPKI بدون ROA210.179.231.0
- 210.179.238.0/24AS10196KOOKMIN BANKRPKI بدون ROA210.179.238.0
- 210.179.246.0/25AS4766Korea TelecomRPKI بدون ROA210.179.246.0
این متن هنوز به فارسی در دسترس نیست. تا انتشار ترجمه به انگلیسی نمایش داده میشود.
On the internet, routes are announced as prefixes: an autonomous system tells its neighbours via BGP that it can deliver traffic for, say, 144.122.0.0/16 (Middle East Technical University, AS1967). This tool looks a prefix up in our daily copy of the global routing table and shows three things:
- Exact announcements: which AS originates exactly this prefix. More than one origin (a MOAS) is normal for anycast services and some multihomed networks, and suspicious otherwise.
- Covering routes: less-specific announcements that contain it. Traffic follows the most specific route, so a covering route matters if the more-specific one disappears.
- More-specifics: announcements inside it, which may belong to other networks (customers, or a hijack).
Each announced route is also checked against the RPKI: whether a ROA authorises its origin AS.
The table is the view from APNIC’s route collector. Most of the global table is the same from everywhere, but a route that is filtered before it reaches that collector will not appear.
پرسشهای پرتکرار
Why is my /24 not listed but a /16 is?
Your addresses are announced as part of the larger block, and no one announces the /24 separately. That is the normal case for most customers of a provider.
What is a more-specific hijack?
Someone announces a longer prefix inside your space. Because routers prefer the most specific route, traffic goes to them. RPKI with a strict max length makes such announcements invalid.
Can I enter a single address?
Yes. The tool then shows the most specific announced route that contains it.