جست‌وجوی پیشوند BGP
یک پیشوند (یا یک نشانی) وارد کنید. از نسخهٔ روزانهٔ ما از جدول جهانی مسیریابی پاسخ داده می‌شود.
210.204.0.0/16
دقیقاً اعلام‌شده
- 210.204.0.0/16AS4766Korea TelecomRPKI بدون ROA210.204.0.0
- ثبت‌کننده
- APNIC · کرهٔ جنوبی · ۴ خرداد ۱۳۷۸
- بلوک واگذارشده
- 210.204.0.0 – 210.204.255.255
مسیرهای پوشاننده
هیچ مسیر کلی‌تری آن را نمی‌پوشاند.
مسیرهای جزئی‌تر
- 210.204.15.0/24AS4766Korea TelecomRPKI بدون ROA210.204.15.0
- 210.204.24.0/24AS4766Korea TelecomRPKI بدون ROA210.204.24.0
- 210.204.27.0/24AS4766Korea TelecomRPKI بدون ROA210.204.27.0
- 210.204.32.0/24AS4766Korea TelecomRPKI بدون ROA210.204.32.0
- 210.204.52.128/25AS45400Korea TelecomRPKI بدون ROA210.204.52.128
- 210.204.58.128/25AS17841NATIONAL INFORMATION RESOURCES SERVICERPKI بدون ROA210.204.58.128
- 210.204.64.0/20AS4766Korea TelecomRPKI بدون ROA210.204.64.0
- 210.204.102.0/24AS4766Korea TelecomRPKI بدون ROA210.204.102.0
- 210.204.107.0/24AS10176Daejon Metropolitan Office of EducationRPKI بدون ROA210.204.107.0
- 210.204.121.0/24AS4766Korea TelecomRPKI بدون ROA210.204.121.0
- 210.204.153.128/25AS4766Korea TelecomRPKI بدون ROA210.204.153.128
- 210.204.160.0/24AS4766Korea TelecomRPKI بدون ROA210.204.160.0
- 210.204.173.0/24AS4766Korea TelecomRPKI بدون ROA210.204.173.0
- 210.204.190.0/24AS4766Korea TelecomRPKI بدون ROA210.204.190.0
- 210.204.191.0/24AS4766Korea TelecomRPKI بدون ROA210.204.191.0
- 210.204.213.0/24AS45400Korea TelecomRPKI بدون ROA210.204.213.0
- 210.204.226.0/24AS45400Korea TelecomRPKI بدون ROA210.204.226.0
- 210.204.227.0/24AS45400Korea TelecomRPKI بدون ROA210.204.227.0
- 210.204.245.0/24AS4766Korea TelecomRPKI بدون ROA210.204.245.0
- 210.204.246.0/24AS4766Korea TelecomRPKI بدون ROA210.204.246.0
- 210.204.255.0/24AS4766Korea TelecomRPKI بدون ROA210.204.255.0
این متن هنوز به فارسی در دسترس نیست. تا انتشار ترجمه به انگلیسی نمایش داده می‌شود.
On the internet, routes are announced as prefixes: an autonomous system tells its neighbours via BGP that it can deliver traffic for, say, 144.122.0.0/16 (Middle East Technical University, AS1967). This tool looks a prefix up in our daily copy of the global routing table and shows three things:
- Exact announcements: which AS originates exactly this prefix. More than one origin (a MOAS) is normal for anycast services and some multihomed networks, and suspicious otherwise.
- Covering routes: less-specific announcements that contain it. Traffic follows the most specific route, so a covering route matters if the more-specific one disappears.
- More-specifics: announcements inside it, which may belong to other networks (customers, or a hijack).
Each announced route is also checked against the RPKI: whether a ROA authorises its origin AS.
The table is the view from APNIC’s route collector. Most of the global table is the same from everywhere, but a route that is filtered before it reaches that collector will not appear.
پرسش‌های پرتکرار
Why is my /24 not listed but a /16 is?
Your addresses are announced as part of the larger block, and no one announces the /24 separately. That is the normal case for most customers of a provider.
What is a more-specific hijack?
Someone announces a longer prefix inside your space. Because routers prefer the most specific route, traffic goes to them. RPKI with a strict max length makes such announcements invalid.
Can I enter a single address?
Yes. The tool then shows the most specific announced route that contains it.