جستوجوی پیشوند BGP
یک پیشوند (یا یک نشانی) وارد کنید. از نسخهٔ روزانهٔ ما از جدول جهانی مسیریابی پاسخ داده میشود.
220.164.0.0/15
دقیقاً اعلامشده
- 220.164.0.0/15AS4134No.31,Jin-rong StreetRPKI معتبر220.164.0.0
- ثبتکننده
- APNIC · چین · ۸ آبان ۱۳۸۱
- بلوک واگذارشده
- 220.160.0.0 – 220.191.255.255
مسیرهای پوشاننده
هیچ مسیر کلیتری آن را نمیپوشاند.
مسیرهای جزئیتر
- 220.164.253.0/24AS134767CHINANET Sichuan province Chengdu MAN networkRPKI معتبر220.164.253.0
- 220.165.0.0/24AS134765CHINANET Yunnan province IDC1 networkRPKI معتبر220.165.0.0
- 220.165.1.0/24AS134765CHINANET Yunnan province IDC1 networkRPKI معتبر220.165.1.0
- 220.165.2.0/24AS134765CHINANET Yunnan province IDC1 networkRPKI معتبر220.165.2.0
- 220.165.3.0/24AS134765CHINANET Yunnan province IDC1 networkRPKI معتبر220.165.3.0
- 220.165.4.0/24AS134765CHINANET Yunnan province IDC1 networkRPKI معتبر220.165.4.0
- 220.165.5.0/24AS134765CHINANET Yunnan province IDC1 networkRPKI معتبر220.165.5.0
- 220.165.7.0/24AS134765CHINANET Yunnan province IDC1 networkRPKI معتبر220.165.7.0
- 220.165.8.0/24AS134765CHINANET Yunnan province IDC1 networkRPKI معتبر220.165.8.0
- 220.165.9.0/24AS134765CHINANET Yunnan province IDC1 networkRPKI معتبر220.165.9.0
- 220.165.10.0/24AS134765CHINANET Yunnan province IDC1 networkRPKI معتبر220.165.10.0
- 220.165.11.0/24AS134765CHINANET Yunnan province IDC1 networkRPKI معتبر220.165.11.0
- 220.165.12.0/24AS134765CHINANET Yunnan province IDC1 networkRPKI معتبر220.165.12.0
- 220.165.13.0/24AS134765CHINANET Yunnan province IDC1 networkRPKI معتبر220.165.13.0
- 220.165.14.0/24AS134765CHINANET Yunnan province IDC1 networkRPKI معتبر220.165.14.0
- 220.165.15.0/24AS134765CHINANET Yunnan province IDC1 networkRPKI معتبر220.165.15.0
این متن هنوز به فارسی در دسترس نیست. تا انتشار ترجمه به انگلیسی نمایش داده میشود.
On the internet, routes are announced as prefixes: an autonomous system tells its neighbours via BGP that it can deliver traffic for, say, 144.122.0.0/16 (Middle East Technical University, AS1967). This tool looks a prefix up in our daily copy of the global routing table and shows three things:
- Exact announcements: which AS originates exactly this prefix. More than one origin (a MOAS) is normal for anycast services and some multihomed networks, and suspicious otherwise.
- Covering routes: less-specific announcements that contain it. Traffic follows the most specific route, so a covering route matters if the more-specific one disappears.
- More-specifics: announcements inside it, which may belong to other networks (customers, or a hijack).
Each announced route is also checked against the RPKI: whether a ROA authorises its origin AS.
The table is the view from APNIC’s route collector. Most of the global table is the same from everywhere, but a route that is filtered before it reaches that collector will not appear.
پرسشهای پرتکرار
Why is my /24 not listed but a /16 is?
Your addresses are announced as part of the larger block, and no one announces the /24 separately. That is the normal case for most customers of a provider.
What is a more-specific hijack?
Someone announces a longer prefix inside your space. Because routers prefer the most specific route, traffic goes to them. RPKI with a strict max length makes such announcements invalid.
Can I enter a single address?
Yes. The tool then shows the most specific announced route that contains it.