جست‌وجوی پیشوند BGP
یک پیشوند (یا یک نشانی) وارد کنید. از نسخهٔ روزانهٔ ما از جدول جهانی مسیریابی پاسخ داده می‌شود.
222.216.0.0/15
دقیقاً اعلام‌شده
- 222.216.0.0/15AS4134No.31,Jin-rong StreetRPKI معتبر222.216.0.0
- ثبت‌کننده
- APNIC · چین · ۵ فروردین ۱۳۸۳
- بلوک واگذارشده
- 222.216.0.0 – 222.217.255.255
مسیرهای پوشاننده
هیچ مسیر کلی‌تری آن را نمی‌پوشاند.
مسیرهای جزئی‌تر
- 222.216.120.0/24AS137693CHINATELECOM Guangxi Nanning IDC networkdescr: Nanning , Guangxi Province, P.R.China.RPKI معتبر222.216.120.0
- 222.216.121.0/24AS137693CHINATELECOM Guangxi Nanning IDC networkdescr: Nanning , Guangxi Province, P.R.China.RPKI معتبر222.216.121.0
- 222.216.122.0/24AS137693CHINATELECOM Guangxi Nanning IDC networkdescr: Nanning , Guangxi Province, P.R.China.RPKI معتبر222.216.122.0
- 222.216.123.0/24AS137693CHINATELECOM Guangxi Nanning IDC networkdescr: Nanning , Guangxi Province, P.R.China.RPKI معتبر222.216.123.0
- 222.216.124.0/24AS137693CHINATELECOM Guangxi Nanning IDC networkdescr: Nanning , Guangxi Province, P.R.China.RPKI معتبر222.216.124.0
- 222.216.125.0/24AS137693CHINATELECOM Guangxi Nanning IDC networkdescr: Nanning , Guangxi Province, P.R.China.RPKI معتبر222.216.125.0
- 222.216.126.0/24AS137693CHINATELECOM Guangxi Nanning IDC networkdescr: Nanning , Guangxi Province, P.R.China.RPKI معتبر222.216.126.0
- 222.216.127.0/24AS137693CHINATELECOM Guangxi Nanning IDC networkdescr: Nanning , Guangxi Province, P.R.China.RPKI معتبر222.216.127.0
- 222.216.188.0/23AS138169China TelecomRPKI معتبر222.216.188.0
- 222.216.190.0/23AS138169China TelecomRPKI معتبر222.216.190.0
- 222.216.219.0/24AS134419BeihaiRPKI معتبر222.216.219.0
- 222.216.228.0/22AS138169China TelecomRPKI معتبر222.216.228.0
- 222.217.92.0/22AS137693CHINATELECOM Guangxi Nanning IDC networkdescr: Nanning , Guangxi Province, P.R.China.RPKI معتبر222.217.92.0
- 222.217.104.0/21AS134419BeihaiRPKI معتبر222.217.104.0
- 222.217.182.0/24AS134419BeihaiRPKI معتبر222.217.182.0
این متن هنوز به فارسی در دسترس نیست. تا انتشار ترجمه به انگلیسی نمایش داده می‌شود.
On the internet, routes are announced as prefixes: an autonomous system tells its neighbours via BGP that it can deliver traffic for, say, 144.122.0.0/16 (Middle East Technical University, AS1967). This tool looks a prefix up in our daily copy of the global routing table and shows three things:
- Exact announcements: which AS originates exactly this prefix. More than one origin (a MOAS) is normal for anycast services and some multihomed networks, and suspicious otherwise.
- Covering routes: less-specific announcements that contain it. Traffic follows the most specific route, so a covering route matters if the more-specific one disappears.
- More-specifics: announcements inside it, which may belong to other networks (customers, or a hijack).
Each announced route is also checked against the RPKI: whether a ROA authorises its origin AS.
The table is the view from APNIC’s route collector. Most of the global table is the same from everywhere, but a route that is filtered before it reaches that collector will not appear.
پرسش‌های پرتکرار
Why is my /24 not listed but a /16 is?
Your addresses are announced as part of the larger block, and no one announces the /24 separately. That is the normal case for most customers of a provider.
What is a more-specific hijack?
Someone announces a longer prefix inside your space. Because routers prefer the most specific route, traffic goes to them. RPKI with a strict max length makes such announcements invalid.
Can I enter a single address?
Yes. The tool then shows the most specific announced route that contains it.