جستوجوی پیشوند BGP
یک پیشوند (یا یک نشانی) وارد کنید. از نسخهٔ روزانهٔ ما از جدول جهانی مسیریابی پاسخ داده میشود.
2405:1f00::/32
دقیقاً اعلامشده
- 2405:1f00::/32AS38077Timor Telecom, SARPKI معتبر2405:1f00::
- ثبتکننده
- APNIC · تیمور-لسته · ۲۱ شهریور ۱۳۹۱
- بلوک واگذارشده
- 2405:1f00:: – 2405:1f00:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff
مسیرهای پوشاننده
هیچ مسیر کلیتری آن را نمیپوشاند.
مسیرهای جزئیتر
- 2405:1f00::/36AS38077Timor Telecom, SARPKI معتبر2405:1f00::
- 2405:1f00:1000::/36AS38077Timor Telecom, SARPKI معتبر2405:1f00:1000::
- 2405:1f00:2000::/36AS38077Timor Telecom, SARPKI معتبر2405:1f00:2000::
- 2405:1f00:3000::/36AS38077Timor Telecom, SARPKI معتبر2405:1f00:3000::
- 2405:1f00:4000::/36AS38077Timor Telecom, SARPKI معتبر2405:1f00:4000::
- 2405:1f00:5000::/36AS38077Timor Telecom, SARPKI معتبر2405:1f00:5000::
- 2405:1f00:6000::/36AS38077Timor Telecom, SARPKI معتبر2405:1f00:6000::
- 2405:1f00:7000::/36AS38077Timor Telecom, SARPKI معتبر2405:1f00:7000::
- 2405:1f00:8000::/36AS38077Timor Telecom, SARPKI معتبر2405:1f00:8000::
- 2405:1f00:9000::/36AS38077Timor Telecom, SARPKI معتبر2405:1f00:9000::
- 2405:1f00:a000::/36AS38077Timor Telecom, SARPKI معتبر2405:1f00:a000::
- 2405:1f00:b000::/36AS38077Timor Telecom, SARPKI معتبر2405:1f00:b000::
- 2405:1f00:c000::/36AS38077Timor Telecom, SARPKI معتبر2405:1f00:c000::
- 2405:1f00:d000::/36AS38077Timor Telecom, SARPKI معتبر2405:1f00:d000::
- 2405:1f00:e000::/36AS38077Timor Telecom, SARPKI معتبر2405:1f00:e000::
- 2405:1f00:f000::/36AS38077Timor Telecom, SARPKI معتبر2405:1f00:f000::
این متن هنوز به فارسی در دسترس نیست. تا انتشار ترجمه به انگلیسی نمایش داده میشود.
On the internet, routes are announced as prefixes: an autonomous system tells its neighbours via BGP that it can deliver traffic for, say, 144.122.0.0/16 (Middle East Technical University, AS1967). This tool looks a prefix up in our daily copy of the global routing table and shows three things:
- Exact announcements: which AS originates exactly this prefix. More than one origin (a MOAS) is normal for anycast services and some multihomed networks, and suspicious otherwise.
- Covering routes: less-specific announcements that contain it. Traffic follows the most specific route, so a covering route matters if the more-specific one disappears.
- More-specifics: announcements inside it, which may belong to other networks (customers, or a hijack).
Each announced route is also checked against the RPKI: whether a ROA authorises its origin AS.
The table is the view from APNIC’s route collector. Most of the global table is the same from everywhere, but a route that is filtered before it reaches that collector will not appear.
پرسشهای پرتکرار
Why is my /24 not listed but a /16 is?
Your addresses are announced as part of the larger block, and no one announces the /24 separately. That is the normal case for most customers of a provider.
What is a more-specific hijack?
Someone announces a longer prefix inside your space. Because routers prefer the most specific route, traffic goes to them. RPKI with a strict max length makes such announcements invalid.
Can I enter a single address?
Yes. The tool then shows the most specific announced route that contains it.