جستوجوی پیشوند BGP
یک پیشوند (یا یک نشانی) وارد کنید. از نسخهٔ روزانهٔ ما از جدول جهانی مسیریابی پاسخ داده میشود.
27.152.0.0/13
دقیقاً اعلامشده
- 27.152.0.0/13AS4134No.31,Jin-rong StreetRPKI معتبر27.152.0.0
- ثبتکننده
- APNIC · چین · ۶ فروردین ۱۳۸۹
- بلوک واگذارشده
- 27.152.0.0 – 27.159.255.255
مسیرهای پوشاننده
هیچ مسیر کلیتری آن را نمیپوشاند.
مسیرهای جزئیتر
- 27.152.28.0/23AS133776QuanzhouRPKI معتبر27.152.28.0
- 27.152.60.0/24AS133776QuanzhouRPKI معتبر27.152.60.0
- 27.152.180.0/24AS133776QuanzhouRPKI معتبر27.152.180.0
- 27.152.181.0/24AS133776QuanzhouRPKI معتبر27.152.181.0
- 27.152.182.0/23AS133776QuanzhouRPKI معتبر27.152.182.0
- 27.152.184.0/23AS133776QuanzhouRPKI معتبر27.152.184.0
- 27.152.186.0/23AS133776QuanzhouRPKI معتبر27.152.186.0
- 27.152.188.0/23AS133776QuanzhouRPKI معتبر27.152.188.0
- 27.152.190.0/24AS133776QuanzhouRPKI معتبر27.152.190.0
- 27.152.191.0/24AS133776QuanzhouRPKI معتبر27.152.191.0
- 27.155.64.0/19AS133774FuzhouRPKI معتبر27.155.64.0
- 27.155.77.0/24AS133774FuzhouRPKI معتبر27.155.77.0
- 27.155.78.0/23AS133774FuzhouRPKI معتبر27.155.78.0
- 27.155.96.0/21AS133774FuzhouRPKI معتبر27.155.96.0
- 27.155.96.0/24AS133774FuzhouRPKI معتبر27.155.96.0
- 27.155.104.0/21AS133774FuzhouRPKI معتبر27.155.104.0
- 27.155.112.0/20AS133774FuzhouRPKI معتبر27.155.112.0
- 27.156.0.0/20AS133774FuzhouRPKI معتبر27.156.0.0
- 27.156.26.0/23AS58772CHINANET Fujian province Fuzhou IDC networkRPKI معتبر27.156.26.0
- 27.156.44.0/23AS4809China Telecom Next Generation Carrier NetworkRPKI معتبر27.156.44.0
- 27.159.96.0/21AS133775XiamenRPKI معتبر27.159.96.0
- 27.159.122.0/23AS133774FuzhouRPKI معتبر27.159.122.0
- 27.159.124.0/22AS133774FuzhouRPKI معتبر27.159.124.0
این متن هنوز به فارسی در دسترس نیست. تا انتشار ترجمه به انگلیسی نمایش داده میشود.
On the internet, routes are announced as prefixes: an autonomous system tells its neighbours via BGP that it can deliver traffic for, say, 144.122.0.0/16 (Middle East Technical University, AS1967). This tool looks a prefix up in our daily copy of the global routing table and shows three things:
- Exact announcements: which AS originates exactly this prefix. More than one origin (a MOAS) is normal for anycast services and some multihomed networks, and suspicious otherwise.
- Covering routes: less-specific announcements that contain it. Traffic follows the most specific route, so a covering route matters if the more-specific one disappears.
- More-specifics: announcements inside it, which may belong to other networks (customers, or a hijack).
Each announced route is also checked against the RPKI: whether a ROA authorises its origin AS.
The table is the view from APNIC’s route collector. Most of the global table is the same from everywhere, but a route that is filtered before it reaches that collector will not appear.
پرسشهای پرتکرار
Why is my /24 not listed but a /16 is?
Your addresses are announced as part of the larger block, and no one announces the /24 separately. That is the normal case for most customers of a provider.
What is a more-specific hijack?
Someone announces a longer prefix inside your space. Because routers prefer the most specific route, traffic goes to them. RPKI with a strict max length makes such announcements invalid.
Can I enter a single address?
Yes. The tool then shows the most specific announced route that contains it.