جستوجوی پیشوند BGP
یک پیشوند (یا یک نشانی) وارد کنید. از نسخهٔ روزانهٔ ما از جدول جهانی مسیریابی پاسخ داده میشود.
2a00:1d36:3000::/36
دقیقاً اعلامشده
- 2a00:1d36:3000::/36AS9121Turk Telekomunikasyon Anonim SirketiRPKI معتبر2a00:1d36:3000::
- ثبتکننده
- RIPE NCC · ترکیه · ۲۱ اسفند ۱۳۸۸
- بلوک واگذارشده
- 2a00:1d30:: – 2a00:1d37:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff
مسیرهای پوشاننده
- 2a00:1d36::/32AS9121Turk Telekomunikasyon Anonim SirketiRPKI معتبر2a00:1d36::
مسیرهای جزئیتر
- 2a00:1d36:3000::/40AS47331TTNet A.S.RPKI معتبر2a00:1d36:3000::
- 2a00:1d36:3100::/40AS47331TTNet A.S.RPKI معتبر2a00:1d36:3100::
- 2a00:1d36:3200::/40AS47331TTNet A.S.RPKI معتبر2a00:1d36:3200::
- 2a00:1d36:3300::/40AS47331TTNet A.S.RPKI معتبر2a00:1d36:3300::
- 2a00:1d36:3400::/40AS47331TTNet A.S.RPKI معتبر2a00:1d36:3400::
- 2a00:1d36:3500::/40AS47331TTNet A.S.RPKI معتبر2a00:1d36:3500::
- 2a00:1d36:3600::/40AS47331TTNet A.S.RPKI معتبر2a00:1d36:3600::
- 2a00:1d36:3700::/40AS47331TTNet A.S.RPKI معتبر2a00:1d36:3700::
- 2a00:1d36:3800::/40AS47331TTNet A.S.RPKI معتبر2a00:1d36:3800::
- 2a00:1d36:3900::/40AS47331TTNet A.S.RPKI معتبر2a00:1d36:3900::
- 2a00:1d36:3a00::/40AS47331TTNet A.S.RPKI معتبر2a00:1d36:3a00::
- 2a00:1d36:3b00::/40AS47331TTNet A.S.RPKI معتبر2a00:1d36:3b00::
- 2a00:1d36:3c00::/40AS47331TTNet A.S.RPKI معتبر2a00:1d36:3c00::
- 2a00:1d36:3d00::/40AS47331TTNet A.S.RPKI معتبر2a00:1d36:3d00::
- 2a00:1d36:3e00::/40AS47331TTNet A.S.RPKI معتبر2a00:1d36:3e00::
- 2a00:1d36:3f00::/40AS47331TTNet A.S.RPKI معتبر2a00:1d36:3f00::
این متن هنوز به فارسی در دسترس نیست. تا انتشار ترجمه به انگلیسی نمایش داده میشود.
On the internet, routes are announced as prefixes: an autonomous system tells its neighbours via BGP that it can deliver traffic for, say, 144.122.0.0/16 (Middle East Technical University, AS1967). This tool looks a prefix up in our daily copy of the global routing table and shows three things:
- Exact announcements: which AS originates exactly this prefix. More than one origin (a MOAS) is normal for anycast services and some multihomed networks, and suspicious otherwise.
- Covering routes: less-specific announcements that contain it. Traffic follows the most specific route, so a covering route matters if the more-specific one disappears.
- More-specifics: announcements inside it, which may belong to other networks (customers, or a hijack).
Each announced route is also checked against the RPKI: whether a ROA authorises its origin AS.
The table is the view from APNIC’s route collector. Most of the global table is the same from everywhere, but a route that is filtered before it reaches that collector will not appear.
پرسشهای پرتکرار
Why is my /24 not listed but a /16 is?
Your addresses are announced as part of the larger block, and no one announces the /24 separately. That is the normal case for most customers of a provider.
What is a more-specific hijack?
Someone announces a longer prefix inside your space. Because routers prefer the most specific route, traffic goes to them. RPKI with a strict max length makes such announcements invalid.
Can I enter a single address?
Yes. The tool then shows the most specific announced route that contains it.