جست‌وجوی پیشوند BGP
یک پیشوند (یا یک نشانی) وارد کنید. از نسخهٔ روزانهٔ ما از جدول جهانی مسیریابی پاسخ داده می‌شود.
38.158.32.0/19
دقیقاً اعلام‌شده
- 38.158.32.0/19AS33647Yadkin Valley TelephoneRPKI معتبر38.158.32.0
- ثبت‌کننده
- ARIN · ایالات متحده · ۲۷ فروردین ۱۳۷۰
- بلوک واگذارشده
- 38.0.0.0 – 38.255.255.255
مسیرهای پوشاننده
- 38.0.0.0/8AS174Cogent Communications, LLCRPKI بدون ROA38.0.0.0
مسیرهای جزئی‌تر
- 38.158.33.0/24AS33647Yadkin Valley TelephoneRPKI معتبر38.158.33.0
- 38.158.37.0/24AS33647Yadkin Valley TelephoneRPKI معتبر38.158.37.0
- 38.158.38.0/24AS33647Yadkin Valley TelephoneRPKI معتبر38.158.38.0
- 38.158.39.0/24AS33647Yadkin Valley TelephoneRPKI معتبر38.158.39.0
- 38.158.40.0/24AS33647Yadkin Valley TelephoneRPKI معتبر38.158.40.0
- 38.158.44.0/24AS33647Yadkin Valley TelephoneRPKI معتبر38.158.44.0
- 38.158.45.0/24AS33647Yadkin Valley TelephoneRPKI معتبر38.158.45.0
- 38.158.46.0/24AS33647Yadkin Valley TelephoneRPKI معتبر38.158.46.0
- 38.158.47.0/24AS33647Yadkin Valley TelephoneRPKI معتبر38.158.47.0
- 38.158.48.0/24AS33647Yadkin Valley TelephoneRPKI معتبر38.158.48.0
- 38.158.49.0/24AS33647Yadkin Valley TelephoneRPKI معتبر38.158.49.0
- 38.158.51.0/24AS33647Yadkin Valley TelephoneRPKI معتبر38.158.51.0
- 38.158.52.0/24AS33647Yadkin Valley TelephoneRPKI معتبر38.158.52.0
- 38.158.54.0/24AS33647Yadkin Valley TelephoneRPKI معتبر38.158.54.0
- 38.158.55.0/24AS33647Yadkin Valley TelephoneRPKI معتبر38.158.55.0
- 38.158.57.0/24AS33647Yadkin Valley TelephoneRPKI معتبر38.158.57.0
- 38.158.58.0/24AS33647Yadkin Valley TelephoneRPKI معتبر38.158.58.0
- 38.158.59.0/24AS33647Yadkin Valley TelephoneRPKI معتبر38.158.59.0
- 38.158.61.0/24AS33647Yadkin Valley TelephoneRPKI معتبر38.158.61.0
- 38.158.62.0/24AS33647Yadkin Valley TelephoneRPKI معتبر38.158.62.0
این متن هنوز به فارسی در دسترس نیست. تا انتشار ترجمه به انگلیسی نمایش داده می‌شود.
On the internet, routes are announced as prefixes: an autonomous system tells its neighbours via BGP that it can deliver traffic for, say, 144.122.0.0/16 (Middle East Technical University, AS1967). This tool looks a prefix up in our daily copy of the global routing table and shows three things:
- Exact announcements: which AS originates exactly this prefix. More than one origin (a MOAS) is normal for anycast services and some multihomed networks, and suspicious otherwise.
- Covering routes: less-specific announcements that contain it. Traffic follows the most specific route, so a covering route matters if the more-specific one disappears.
- More-specifics: announcements inside it, which may belong to other networks (customers, or a hijack).
Each announced route is also checked against the RPKI: whether a ROA authorises its origin AS.
The table is the view from APNIC’s route collector. Most of the global table is the same from everywhere, but a route that is filtered before it reaches that collector will not appear.
پرسش‌های پرتکرار
Why is my /24 not listed but a /16 is?
Your addresses are announced as part of the larger block, and no one announces the /24 separately. That is the normal case for most customers of a provider.
What is a more-specific hijack?
Someone announces a longer prefix inside your space. Because routers prefer the most specific route, traffic goes to them. RPKI with a strict max length makes such announcements invalid.
Can I enter a single address?
Yes. The tool then shows the most specific announced route that contains it.