جستوجوی پیشوند BGP
یک پیشوند (یا یک نشانی) وارد کنید. از نسخهٔ روزانهٔ ما از جدول جهانی مسیریابی پاسخ داده میشود.
82.103.64.0/18
دقیقاً اعلامشده
- 82.103.64.0/18AS8717A1 Bulgaria EADRPKI معتبر82.103.64.0
- ثبتکننده
- RIPE NCC · بلغارستان · ۲۳ دی ۱۳۸۲
- بلوک واگذارشده
- 82.103.64.0 – 82.103.127.255
مسیرهای پوشاننده
هیچ مسیر کلیتری آن را نمیپوشاند.
مسیرهای جزئیتر
- 82.103.64.0/24AS44179Progress Software EADRPKI معتبر82.103.64.0
- 82.103.76.0/23AS29580A1 Bulgaria EADRPKI معتبر82.103.76.0
- 82.103.78.0/24AS29580A1 Bulgaria EADRPKI معتبر82.103.78.0
- 82.103.79.0/24AS203312Commercial League - Global Pharma Centre JSCRPKI معتبر82.103.79.0
- 82.103.80.0/24AS35464Datamax JSCRPKI معتبر82.103.80.0
- 82.103.82.0/24AS202209Erma Consulting Ltd.RPKI معتبر82.103.82.0
- 82.103.83.0/24AS29580A1 Bulgaria EADRPKI معتبر82.103.83.0
- 82.103.87.0/24AS42086RO&NI EOODRPKI معتبر82.103.87.0
- 82.103.91.0/24AS8717A1 Bulgaria EADRPKI معتبر82.103.91.0
- 82.103.93.0/24AS202209Erma Consulting Ltd.RPKI معتبر82.103.93.0
- 82.103.100.0/24AS29580A1 Bulgaria EADRPKI معتبر82.103.100.0
- 82.103.103.0/24AS8717A1 Bulgaria EADRPKI معتبر82.103.103.0
- 82.103.104.0/24AS35464Datamax JSCRPKI معتبر82.103.104.0
- 82.103.105.0/24AS7155ViaSat,Inc.RPKI معتبر82.103.105.0
- 82.103.109.0/24AS8717A1 Bulgaria EADRPKI معتبر82.103.109.0
- 82.103.110.0/23AS8717A1 Bulgaria EADRPKI معتبر82.103.110.0
- 82.103.112.0/24AS42794Ultracom Ltd.RPKI معتبر82.103.112.0
- 82.103.124.0/24AS29580A1 Bulgaria EADRPKI معتبر82.103.124.0
- 82.103.125.0/24AS198003Proxiad Bulgaria EADRPKI معتبر82.103.125.0
- 82.103.127.0/24AS8717A1 Bulgaria EADRPKI معتبر82.103.127.0
این متن هنوز به فارسی در دسترس نیست. تا انتشار ترجمه به انگلیسی نمایش داده میشود.
On the internet, routes are announced as prefixes: an autonomous system tells its neighbours via BGP that it can deliver traffic for, say, 144.122.0.0/16 (Middle East Technical University, AS1967). This tool looks a prefix up in our daily copy of the global routing table and shows three things:
- Exact announcements: which AS originates exactly this prefix. More than one origin (a MOAS) is normal for anycast services and some multihomed networks, and suspicious otherwise.
- Covering routes: less-specific announcements that contain it. Traffic follows the most specific route, so a covering route matters if the more-specific one disappears.
- More-specifics: announcements inside it, which may belong to other networks (customers, or a hijack).
Each announced route is also checked against the RPKI: whether a ROA authorises its origin AS.
The table is the view from APNIC’s route collector. Most of the global table is the same from everywhere, but a route that is filtered before it reaches that collector will not appear.
پرسشهای پرتکرار
Why is my /24 not listed but a /16 is?
Your addresses are announced as part of the larger block, and no one announces the /24 separately. That is the normal case for most customers of a provider.
What is a more-specific hijack?
Someone announces a longer prefix inside your space. Because routers prefer the most specific route, traffic goes to them. RPKI with a strict max length makes such announcements invalid.
Can I enter a single address?
Yes. The tool then shows the most specific announced route that contains it.