Ricerca prefisso BGP
Inserisci un prefisso (o un singolo indirizzo). Risposta dalla nostra copia giornaliera della tabella di routing globale.
207.23.0.0/16
Annunciato esattamente
- 207.23.0.0/16AS271BCNETRPKI Nessun ROA207.23.0.0
- Registro
- ARIN · Canada · 4 gen 1996
- Blocco assegnato
- 207.23.0.0 – 207.23.255.255
Rotte che lo coprono
Nessuna rotta meno specifica lo copre.
Rotte più specifiche
- 207.23.8.0/21AS271BCNETRPKI Valida207.23.8.0
- 207.23.85.0/24AS11105Simon Fraser UniversityRPKI Valida207.23.85.0
- 207.23.86.0/24AS11105Simon Fraser UniversityRPKI Valida207.23.86.0
- 207.23.88.0/23AS271BCNETRPKI Valida207.23.88.0
- 207.23.94.0/23AS393249University of British ColumbiaRPKI Valida207.23.94.0
- 207.23.96.0/20AS397543Royal Roads UniversityRPKI Valida207.23.96.0
- 207.23.128.0/19AS397375PROVINCIAL HEALTH SERVICES AUTHORITYRPKI Valida207.23.128.0
- 207.23.160.0/19AS11105Simon Fraser UniversityRPKI Valida207.23.160.0
- 207.23.192.0/19AS11105Simon Fraser UniversityRPKI Valida207.23.192.0
- 207.23.238.0/24AS271BCNETRPKI Valida207.23.238.0
- 207.23.240.0/24AS271BCNETRPKI Valida207.23.240.0
- 207.23.241.0/24AS271BCNETRPKI Valida207.23.241.0
- 207.23.243.0/24AS393249University of British ColumbiaRPKI Valida207.23.243.0
- 207.23.245.0/24AS271BCNETRPKI Valida207.23.245.0
- 207.23.246.0/24AS271BCNETRPKI Valida207.23.246.0
- 207.23.249.0/24AS393249University of British ColumbiaRPKI Valida207.23.249.0
- 207.23.252.0/24AS393249University of British ColumbiaRPKI Valida207.23.252.0
- 207.23.253.0/24AS271BCNETRPKI Valida207.23.253.0
- 207.23.254.0/24AS271BCNETRPKI Valida207.23.254.0
- 207.23.255.0/24AS271BCNETRPKI Valida207.23.255.0
Questo testo non è ancora disponibile in italiano. Viene mostrato in inglese finché non sarà pubblicata una traduzione.
On the internet, routes are announced as prefixes: an autonomous system tells its neighbours via BGP that it can deliver traffic for, say, 144.122.0.0/16 (Middle East Technical University, AS1967). This tool looks a prefix up in our daily copy of the global routing table and shows three things:
- Exact announcements: which AS originates exactly this prefix. More than one origin (a MOAS) is normal for anycast services and some multihomed networks, and suspicious otherwise.
- Covering routes: less-specific announcements that contain it. Traffic follows the most specific route, so a covering route matters if the more-specific one disappears.
- More-specifics: announcements inside it, which may belong to other networks (customers, or a hijack).
Each announced route is also checked against the RPKI: whether a ROA authorises its origin AS.
The table is the view from APNIC’s route collector. Most of the global table is the same from everywhere, but a route that is filtered before it reaches that collector will not appear.
Domande frequenti
Why is my /24 not listed but a /16 is?
Your addresses are announced as part of the larger block, and no one announces the /24 separately. That is the normal case for most customers of a provider.
What is a more-specific hijack?
Someone announces a longer prefix inside your space. Because routers prefer the most specific route, traffic goes to them. RPKI with a strict max length makes such announcements invalid.
Can I enter a single address?
Yes. The tool then shows the most specific announced route that contains it.
Correlati
- Validatore di rotte RPKIL'AS di origine di una rotta è autorizzato da un ROA?
- Ricerca ASNTitolare, registro e tutti i prefissi annunciati da un AS.
- Ricerca IPASN, provider, route, DNS inverso e posizione di qualsiasi indirizzo.
- Calcolatore CIDRRete, broadcast, maschere e numero di host per qualsiasi prefisso.