Ricerca prefisso BGP
Inserisci un prefisso (o un singolo indirizzo). Risposta dalla nostra copia giornaliera della tabella di routing globale.
240e:698::/29
Annunciato esattamente
- 240e:698::/29AS4134No.31,Jin-rong StreetRPKI Nessun ROA240e:698::
- Registro
- APNIC · Cina · 14 dic 2011
- Blocco assegnato
- 240e:400:: – 240e:7ff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff
Rotte che lo coprono
Rotte più specifiche
- 240e:698::/36AS58519Cloud Computing CorporationRPKI Valida240e:698::
- 240e:698:1000::/36AS58519Cloud Computing CorporationRPKI Valida240e:698:1000::
- 240e:698:2100::/40AS4811China Telecom (Group)RPKI Valida240e:698:2100::
- 240e:698:2100::/41AS4811China Telecom (Group)RPKI Valida240e:698:2100::
- 240e:698:2180::/41AS4811China Telecom (Group)RPKI Valida240e:698:2180::
- 240e:698:2200::/40AS58466CHINANET Guangdong province networkRPKI Valida240e:698:2200::
- 240e:698:2400::/40AS134768CHINANET SHAANXI province Cloud Base networkRPKI Valida240e:698:2400::
- 240e:698:2500::/40AS134756CHINANET Nanjing Jishan IDC networkRPKI Valida240e:698:2500::
- 240e:698:2700::/40AS133774FuzhouRPKI Valida240e:698:2700::
- 240e:698:2800::/40AS133775XiamenRPKI Valida240e:698:2800::
- 240e:698:2a00::/40AS63835No.293,Wanbao AvenueRPKI Valida240e:698:2a00::
- 240e:698:4200::/40AS58466CHINANET Guangdong province networkRPKI Valida240e:698:4200::
- 240e:698:4300::/40AS63835No.293,Wanbao AvenueRPKI Valida240e:698:4300::
- 240e:698:4400::/40AS134768CHINANET SHAANXI province Cloud Base networkRPKI Valida240e:698:4400::
- 240e:698:4600::/40AS134756CHINANET Nanjing Jishan IDC networkRPKI Valida240e:698:4600::
- 240e:698:4700::/40AS131325CHINATELECOM JIANGSU province NANTONG MAN networkRPKI Valida240e:698:4700::
- 240e:698:4800::/40AS134769ChinaNet Jiangsu Changzhou Liyang IDC networkRPKI Valida240e:698:4800::
- 240e:698:4b00::/40AS133774FuzhouRPKI Valida240e:698:4b00::
- 240e:699:7a00::/48AS4809China Telecom Next Generation Carrier NetworkRPKI Valida240e:699:7a00::
- 240e:699:7a01::/48AS4809China Telecom Next Generation Carrier NetworkRPKI Valida240e:699:7a01::
- 240e:699:7b00::/48AS4809China Telecom Next Generation Carrier NetworkRPKI Valida240e:699:7b00::
- 240e:699:7b03::/48AS4809China Telecom Next Generation Carrier NetworkRPKI Valida240e:699:7b03::
- 240e:699:7b06::/48AS4809China Telecom Next Generation Carrier NetworkRPKI Valida240e:699:7b06::
- 240e:699:7b07::/48AS4809China Telecom Next Generation Carrier NetworkRPKI Valida240e:699:7b07::
- 240e:699:7b08::/48AS4809China Telecom Next Generation Carrier NetworkRPKI Valida240e:699:7b08::
- 240e:699:7b0a::/48AS4809China Telecom Next Generation Carrier NetworkRPKI Valida240e:699:7b0a::
- 240e:699:7b0c::/48AS4809China Telecom Next Generation Carrier NetworkRPKI Valida240e:699:7b0c::
- 240e:699:7b0d::/48AS4809China Telecom Next Generation Carrier NetworkRPKI Valida240e:699:7b0d::
- 240e:699:7b0f::/48AS4809China Telecom Next Generation Carrier NetworkRPKI Valida240e:699:7b0f::
- 240e:699:7b11::/48AS4809China Telecom Next Generation Carrier NetworkRPKI Valida240e:699:7b11::
- 240e:699:7b12::/48AS4809China Telecom Next Generation Carrier NetworkRPKI Valida240e:699:7b12::
- 240e:699:bc00::/38AS4809China Telecom Next Generation Carrier NetworkRPKI Valida240e:699:bc00::
Questo testo non è ancora disponibile in italiano. Viene mostrato in inglese finché non sarà pubblicata una traduzione.
On the internet, routes are announced as prefixes: an autonomous system tells its neighbours via BGP that it can deliver traffic for, say, 144.122.0.0/16 (Middle East Technical University, AS1967). This tool looks a prefix up in our daily copy of the global routing table and shows three things:
- Exact announcements: which AS originates exactly this prefix. More than one origin (a MOAS) is normal for anycast services and some multihomed networks, and suspicious otherwise.
- Covering routes: less-specific announcements that contain it. Traffic follows the most specific route, so a covering route matters if the more-specific one disappears.
- More-specifics: announcements inside it, which may belong to other networks (customers, or a hijack).
Each announced route is also checked against the RPKI: whether a ROA authorises its origin AS.
The table is the view from APNIC’s route collector. Most of the global table is the same from everywhere, but a route that is filtered before it reaches that collector will not appear.
Domande frequenti
Why is my /24 not listed but a /16 is?
Your addresses are announced as part of the larger block, and no one announces the /24 separately. That is the normal case for most customers of a provider.
What is a more-specific hijack?
Someone announces a longer prefix inside your space. Because routers prefer the most specific route, traffic goes to them. RPKI with a strict max length makes such announcements invalid.
Can I enter a single address?
Yes. The tool then shows the most specific announced route that contains it.
Correlati
- Validatore di rotte RPKIL'AS di origine di una rotta è autorizzato da un ROA?
- Ricerca ASNTitolare, registro e tutti i prefissi annunciati da un AS.
- Ricerca IPASN, provider, route, DNS inverso e posizione di qualsiasi indirizzo.
- Calcolatore CIDRRete, broadcast, maschere e numero di host per qualsiasi prefisso.