Ricerca prefisso BGP
Inserisci un prefisso (o un singolo indirizzo). Risposta dalla nostra copia giornaliera della tabella di routing globale.
2620:147::/36
Annunciato esattamente
- 2620:147::/36AS13778Johnson & JohnsonRPKI Valida2620:147::
- Registro
- ARIN · Stati Uniti · 20 apr 2011
- Blocco assegnato
- 2620:147:: – 2620:147:fff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff
Rotte che lo coprono
Nessuna rotta meno specifica lo copre.
Rotte più specifiche
- 2620:147::/37AS198949Radware LtdRPKI Valida2620:147::
- 2620:147:1::/48AS198949Radware LtdRPKI Valida2620:147:1::
- 2620:147:110::/44AS13778Johnson & JohnsonRPKI Valida2620:147:110::
- 2620:147:110::/45AS198949Radware LtdRPKI Valida2620:147:110::
- 2620:147:118::/45AS198949Radware LtdRPKI Valida2620:147:118::
- 2620:147:120::/44AS13778Johnson & JohnsonRPKI Valida2620:147:120::
- 2620:147:120::/45AS198949Radware LtdRPKI Valida2620:147:120::
- 2620:147:128::/45AS198949Radware LtdRPKI Valida2620:147:128::
- 2620:147:130::/44AS13778Johnson & JohnsonRPKI Valida2620:147:130::
- 2620:147:130::/45AS198949Radware LtdRPKI Valida2620:147:130::
- 2620:147:138::/45AS198949Radware LtdRPKI Valida2620:147:138::
- 2620:147:140::/44AS13778Johnson & JohnsonRPKI Valida2620:147:140::
- 2620:147:140::/45AS198949Radware LtdRPKI Valida2620:147:140::
- 2620:147:148::/45AS198949Radware LtdRPKI Valida2620:147:148::
- 2620:147:800::/37AS198949Radware LtdRPKI Valida2620:147:800::
- 2620:147:c10::/48AS14618Amazon.com, Inc.RPKI Valida2620:147:c10::
- 2620:147:c11::/48AS14618Amazon.com, Inc.RPKI Valida2620:147:c11::
- 2620:147:c40::/48AS16509Amazon.com, Inc.RPKI Valida2620:147:c40::
- 2620:147:d11::/48AS8075Microsoft CorporationRPKI Valida2620:147:d11::
- 2620:147:d13::/48AS16509Amazon.com, Inc.RPKI Valida2620:147:d13::
Questo testo non è ancora disponibile in italiano. Viene mostrato in inglese finché non sarà pubblicata una traduzione.
On the internet, routes are announced as prefixes: an autonomous system tells its neighbours via BGP that it can deliver traffic for, say, 144.122.0.0/16 (Middle East Technical University, AS1967). This tool looks a prefix up in our daily copy of the global routing table and shows three things:
- Exact announcements: which AS originates exactly this prefix. More than one origin (a MOAS) is normal for anycast services and some multihomed networks, and suspicious otherwise.
- Covering routes: less-specific announcements that contain it. Traffic follows the most specific route, so a covering route matters if the more-specific one disappears.
- More-specifics: announcements inside it, which may belong to other networks (customers, or a hijack).
Each announced route is also checked against the RPKI: whether a ROA authorises its origin AS.
The table is the view from APNIC’s route collector. Most of the global table is the same from everywhere, but a route that is filtered before it reaches that collector will not appear.
Domande frequenti
Why is my /24 not listed but a /16 is?
Your addresses are announced as part of the larger block, and no one announces the /24 separately. That is the normal case for most customers of a provider.
What is a more-specific hijack?
Someone announces a longer prefix inside your space. Because routers prefer the most specific route, traffic goes to them. RPKI with a strict max length makes such announcements invalid.
Can I enter a single address?
Yes. The tool then shows the most specific announced route that contains it.
Correlati
- Validatore di rotte RPKIL'AS di origine di una rotta è autorizzato da un ROA?
- Ricerca ASNTitolare, registro e tutti i prefissi annunciati da un AS.
- Ricerca IPASN, provider, route, DNS inverso e posizione di qualsiasi indirizzo.
- Calcolatore CIDRRete, broadcast, maschere e numero di host per qualsiasi prefisso.