Ricerca prefisso BGP
Inserisci un prefisso (o un singolo indirizzo). Risposta dalla nostra copia giornaliera della tabella di routing globale.
2a00:79e1::/32
Annunciato esattamente
- 2a00:79e1::/32AS36384Google LLCRPKI Valida2a00:79e1::
- Registro
- RIPE NCC · Svizzera · 24 apr 2013
- Blocco assegnato
- 2a00:79e0:: – 2a00:79e1:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff
Rotte che lo coprono
Nessuna rotta meno specifica lo copre.
Rotte più specifiche
- 2a00:79e1:f07::/48AS395973Google LLCRPKI Valida2a00:79e1:f07::
- 2a00:79e1:f44::/48AS395973Google LLCRPKI Valida2a00:79e1:f44::
- 2a00:79e1:fc1::/48AS395973Google LLCRPKI Valida2a00:79e1:fc1::
- 2a00:79e1:fc2::/48AS395973Google LLCRPKI Valida2a00:79e1:fc2::
- 2a00:79e1:fc4::/48AS395973Google LLCRPKI Valida2a00:79e1:fc4::
- 2a00:79e1:fc5::/48AS395973Google LLCRPKI Valida2a00:79e1:fc5::
- 2a00:79e1:fc6::/48AS395973Google LLCRPKI Valida2a00:79e1:fc6::
- 2a00:79e1:fc7::/48AS395973Google LLCRPKI Valida2a00:79e1:fc7::
- 2a00:79e1:fc8::/48AS395973Google LLCRPKI Valida2a00:79e1:fc8::
- 2a00:79e1:fc9::/48AS395973Google LLCRPKI Valida2a00:79e1:fc9::
- 2a00:79e1:fca::/48AS395973Google LLCRPKI Valida2a00:79e1:fca::
- 2a00:79e1:fcb::/48AS395973Google LLCRPKI Valida2a00:79e1:fcb::
- 2a00:79e1:fcc::/48AS395973Google LLCRPKI Valida2a00:79e1:fcc::
- 2a00:79e1:fcd::/48AS395973Google LLCRPKI Valida2a00:79e1:fcd::
- 2a00:79e1:fce::/48AS395973Google LLCRPKI Valida2a00:79e1:fce::
- 2a00:79e1:fcf::/48AS395973Google LLCRPKI Valida2a00:79e1:fcf::
- 2a00:79e1:fd0::/48AS395973Google LLCRPKI Valida2a00:79e1:fd0::
- 2a00:79e1:fd1::/48AS395973Google LLCRPKI Valida2a00:79e1:fd1::
- 2a00:79e1:fd2::/48AS395973Google LLCRPKI Valida2a00:79e1:fd2::
Questo testo non è ancora disponibile in italiano. Viene mostrato in inglese finché non sarà pubblicata una traduzione.
On the internet, routes are announced as prefixes: an autonomous system tells its neighbours via BGP that it can deliver traffic for, say, 144.122.0.0/16 (Middle East Technical University, AS1967). This tool looks a prefix up in our daily copy of the global routing table and shows three things:
- Exact announcements: which AS originates exactly this prefix. More than one origin (a MOAS) is normal for anycast services and some multihomed networks, and suspicious otherwise.
- Covering routes: less-specific announcements that contain it. Traffic follows the most specific route, so a covering route matters if the more-specific one disappears.
- More-specifics: announcements inside it, which may belong to other networks (customers, or a hijack).
Each announced route is also checked against the RPKI: whether a ROA authorises its origin AS.
The table is the view from APNIC’s route collector. Most of the global table is the same from everywhere, but a route that is filtered before it reaches that collector will not appear.
Domande frequenti
Why is my /24 not listed but a /16 is?
Your addresses are announced as part of the larger block, and no one announces the /24 separately. That is the normal case for most customers of a provider.
What is a more-specific hijack?
Someone announces a longer prefix inside your space. Because routers prefer the most specific route, traffic goes to them. RPKI with a strict max length makes such announcements invalid.
Can I enter a single address?
Yes. The tool then shows the most specific announced route that contains it.
Correlati
- Validatore di rotte RPKIL'AS di origine di una rotta è autorizzato da un ROA?
- Ricerca ASNTitolare, registro e tutti i prefissi annunciati da un AS.
- Ricerca IPASN, provider, route, DNS inverso e posizione di qualsiasi indirizzo.
- Calcolatore CIDRRete, broadcast, maschere e numero di host per qualsiasi prefisso.