Ricerca prefisso BGP
Inserisci un prefisso (o un singolo indirizzo). Risposta dalla nostra copia giornaliera della tabella di routing globale.
2a10:ab80::/29
Annunciato esattamente
- 2a10:ab80::/29AS214891Denis Aleksandrovich IakovlevRPKI Valida2a10:ab80::
- Registro
- RIPE NCC · Russia · 16 feb 2026
- Blocco assegnato
- 2a10:ab80:: – 2a10:ab87:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff
Rotte che lo coprono
Nessuna rotta meno specifica lo copre.
Rotte più specifiche
- 2a10:ab80:100::/48AS218664PrefixLabs DOORPKI Valida2a10:ab80:100::
- 2a10:ab80:102::/48AS218664PrefixLabs DOORPKI Valida2a10:ab80:102::
- 2a10:ab80:3e3::/48AS218914Datagio Systems Ltd.RPKI Valida2a10:ab80:3e3::
- 2a10:ab80:3e5::/48AS214745Arseniy LikhacevRPKI Valida2a10:ab80:3e5::
- 2a10:ab80:3ef::/48AS219431Artur DibrovaRPKI Valida2a10:ab80:3ef::
- 2a10:ab80:3f1::/48AS199417Serghei SamoilovRPKI Valida2a10:ab80:3f1::
- 2a10:ab80:3fa::/48AS201176DUND MC2 B.V.RPKI Valida2a10:ab80:3fa::
- 2a10:ab80:3fb::/48AS201176DUND MC2 B.V.RPKI Valida2a10:ab80:3fb::
- 2a10:ab80:3fd::/48AS218914Datagio Systems Ltd.RPKI Valida2a10:ab80:3fd::
- 2a10:ab80:3fe::/48AS198924Sugailo RaitisRPKI Valida2a10:ab80:3fe::
- 2a10:ab80:400::/48AS219064Akenai Products LTDRPKI Valida2a10:ab80:400::
- 2a10:ab80:401::/48AS219064Akenai Products LTDRPKI Valida2a10:ab80:401::
- 2a10:ab80:402::/48AS219064Akenai Products LTDRPKI Valida2a10:ab80:402::
- 2a10:ab80:403::/48AS219064Akenai Products LTDRPKI Valida2a10:ab80:403::
- 2a10:ab80:404::/48AS219064Akenai Products LTDRPKI Valida2a10:ab80:404::
- 2a10:ab80:405::/48AS219064Akenai Products LTDRPKI Valida2a10:ab80:405::
- 2a10:ab80:448::/48AS218609Mukhammed MamedovRPKI Valida2a10:ab80:448::
- 2a10:ab80:461::/48AS199417Serghei SamoilovRPKI Valida2a10:ab80:461::
Questo testo non è ancora disponibile in italiano. Viene mostrato in inglese finché non sarà pubblicata una traduzione.
On the internet, routes are announced as prefixes: an autonomous system tells its neighbours via BGP that it can deliver traffic for, say, 144.122.0.0/16 (Middle East Technical University, AS1967). This tool looks a prefix up in our daily copy of the global routing table and shows three things:
- Exact announcements: which AS originates exactly this prefix. More than one origin (a MOAS) is normal for anycast services and some multihomed networks, and suspicious otherwise.
- Covering routes: less-specific announcements that contain it. Traffic follows the most specific route, so a covering route matters if the more-specific one disappears.
- More-specifics: announcements inside it, which may belong to other networks (customers, or a hijack).
Each announced route is also checked against the RPKI: whether a ROA authorises its origin AS.
The table is the view from APNIC’s route collector. Most of the global table is the same from everywhere, but a route that is filtered before it reaches that collector will not appear.
Domande frequenti
Why is my /24 not listed but a /16 is?
Your addresses are announced as part of the larger block, and no one announces the /24 separately. That is the normal case for most customers of a provider.
What is a more-specific hijack?
Someone announces a longer prefix inside your space. Because routers prefer the most specific route, traffic goes to them. RPKI with a strict max length makes such announcements invalid.
Can I enter a single address?
Yes. The tool then shows the most specific announced route that contains it.
Correlati
- Validatore di rotte RPKIL'AS di origine di una rotta è autorizzato da un ROA?
- Ricerca ASNTitolare, registro e tutti i prefissi annunciati da un AS.
- Ricerca IPASN, provider, route, DNS inverso e posizione di qualsiasi indirizzo.
- Calcolatore CIDRRete, broadcast, maschere e numero di host per qualsiasi prefisso.