BGPプレフィックス検索
プレフィックス(または単一のアドレス)を入力してください。世界のルーティングテーブルを毎日複製したデータから回答します。
168.143.0.0/16
完全一致で広報
- 168.143.0.0/16AS2914NTT America, Inc.RPKI 有効168.143.0.0
- レジストリ
- ARIN · アメリカ合衆国 · 1994/05/13
- 割り振りブロック
- 168.143.0.0 – 168.143.255.255
包含する経路
包含する集約経路はありません。
より詳細な経路
- 168.143.0.0/18AS6079RCNRPKI 有効168.143.0.0
- 168.143.80.0/20AS203020HostRoyale Technologies Pvt LtdRPKI 有効168.143.80.0
- 168.143.96.0/24AS13700NexusWaveRPKI 有効168.143.96.0
- 168.143.111.0/24AS13700NexusWaveRPKI 有効168.143.111.0
- 168.143.116.0/24AS148996GLOBAL COMMUNICATION NETWORK LIMITEDRPKI 有効168.143.116.0
- 168.143.117.0/24AS148996GLOBAL COMMUNICATION NETWORK LIMITEDRPKI 有効168.143.117.0
- 168.143.118.0/24AS148996GLOBAL COMMUNICATION NETWORK LIMITEDRPKI 有効168.143.118.0
- 168.143.119.0/24AS214432Zhilian Technology CO., LTD.RPKI 有効168.143.119.0
- 168.143.160.0/20AS203020HostRoyale Technologies Pvt LtdRPKI 有効168.143.160.0
- 168.143.160.0/24AS203020HostRoyale Technologies Pvt LtdRPKI 有効168.143.160.0
- 168.143.161.0/24AS203020HostRoyale Technologies Pvt LtdRPKI 有効168.143.161.0
- 168.143.162.0/23AS203020HostRoyale Technologies Pvt LtdRPKI 有効168.143.162.0
- 168.143.164.0/22AS203020HostRoyale Technologies Pvt LtdRPKI 有効168.143.164.0
- 168.143.168.0/21AS203020HostRoyale Technologies Pvt LtdRPKI 有効168.143.168.0
- 168.143.179.0/24AS204670NTT United Kingdom LtdRPKI 有効168.143.179.0
- 168.143.192.0/19AS203020HostRoyale Technologies Pvt LtdRPKI 有効168.143.192.0
- 168.143.236.0/24AS174Cogent Communications, LLCRPKI 有効168.143.236.0
- 168.143.242.0/23AS20940Akamai International B.V.RPKI 有効168.143.242.0
このテキストはまだ日本語で提供されていません。翻訳が公開されるまで英語で表示しています。
On the internet, routes are announced as prefixes: an autonomous system tells its neighbours via BGP that it can deliver traffic for, say, 144.122.0.0/16 (Middle East Technical University, AS1967). This tool looks a prefix up in our daily copy of the global routing table and shows three things:
- Exact announcements: which AS originates exactly this prefix. More than one origin (a MOAS) is normal for anycast services and some multihomed networks, and suspicious otherwise.
- Covering routes: less-specific announcements that contain it. Traffic follows the most specific route, so a covering route matters if the more-specific one disappears.
- More-specifics: announcements inside it, which may belong to other networks (customers, or a hijack).
Each announced route is also checked against the RPKI: whether a ROA authorises its origin AS.
The table is the view from APNIC’s route collector. Most of the global table is the same from everywhere, but a route that is filtered before it reaches that collector will not appear.
よくある質問
Why is my /24 not listed but a /16 is?
Your addresses are announced as part of the larger block, and no one announces the /24 separately. That is the normal case for most customers of a provider.
What is a more-specific hijack?
Someone announces a longer prefix inside your space. Because routers prefer the most specific route, traffic goes to them. RPKI with a strict max length makes such announcements invalid.
Can I enter a single address?
Yes. The tool then shows the most specific announced route that contains it.