BGP 前缀查询
输入一个前缀(或单个地址)。由我们每日复制的全球路由表回答。
110.170.0.0/17
精确宣告
- 110.170.0.0/17AS7470TRUE INTERNET Co.,Ltd.RPKI 有效110.170.0.0
- 注册机构
- APNIC · 泰国 · 2009年4月23日
- 分配的地址块
- 110.168.0.0 – 110.171.255.255
覆盖路由
- 110.170.0.0/16AS7470TRUE INTERNET Co.,Ltd.RPKI 有效110.170.0.0
- 110.170.0.0/15AS7470TRUE INTERNET Co.,Ltd.RPKI 有效110.170.0.0
更具体的路由
- 110.170.0.0/19AS7470TRUE INTERNET Co.,Ltd.RPKI 有效110.170.0.0
- 110.170.2.0/24AS7470TRUE INTERNET Co.,Ltd.RPKI 有效110.170.2.0
- 110.170.4.0/24AS7470TRUE INTERNET Co.,Ltd.RPKI 有效110.170.4.0
- 110.170.11.0/24AS7470TRUE INTERNET Co.,Ltd.RPKI 有效110.170.11.0
- 110.170.15.0/24AS7470TRUE INTERNET Co.,Ltd.RPKI 有效110.170.15.0
- 110.170.18.0/24AS7470TRUE INTERNET Co.,Ltd.RPKI 有效110.170.18.0
- 110.170.21.0/24AS7470TRUE INTERNET Co.,Ltd.RPKI 有效110.170.21.0
- 110.170.22.0/24AS7470TRUE INTERNET Co.,Ltd.RPKI 有效110.170.22.0
- 110.170.31.0/24AS7470TRUE INTERNET Co.,Ltd.RPKI 有效110.170.31.0
- 110.170.32.0/19AS7470TRUE INTERNET Co.,Ltd.RPKI 有效110.170.32.0
- 110.170.44.0/24AS7470TRUE INTERNET Co.,Ltd.RPKI 有效110.170.44.0
- 110.170.49.0/24AS7470TRUE INTERNET Co.,Ltd.RPKI 有效110.170.49.0
- 110.170.55.0/24AS7470TRUE INTERNET Co.,Ltd.RPKI 有效110.170.55.0
- 110.170.56.0/24AS7470TRUE INTERNET Co.,Ltd.RPKI 有效110.170.56.0
- 110.170.64.0/19AS7470TRUE INTERNET Co.,Ltd.RPKI 有效110.170.64.0
- 110.170.65.0/24AS7470TRUE INTERNET Co.,Ltd.RPKI 有效110.170.65.0
- 110.170.68.0/24AS7470TRUE INTERNET Co.,Ltd.RPKI 有效110.170.68.0
- 110.170.75.0/24AS7470TRUE INTERNET Co.,Ltd.RPKI 有效110.170.75.0
- 110.170.80.0/24AS7470TRUE INTERNET Co.,Ltd.RPKI 有效110.170.80.0
- 110.170.96.0/19AS7470TRUE INTERNET Co.,Ltd.RPKI 有效110.170.96.0
- 110.170.111.0/24AS7470TRUE INTERNET Co.,Ltd.RPKI 有效110.170.111.0
- 110.170.119.0/24AS7470TRUE INTERNET Co.,Ltd.RPKI 有效110.170.119.0
- 110.170.123.0/24AS132201Land and Houses Bank Public Company LimitedRPKI 有效110.170.123.0
- 110.170.124.0/24AS26937The Midland CompanyRPKI 有效110.170.124.0
- 110.170.127.0/24AS133063KGI Securities (Thailand) PLC.RPKI 有效110.170.127.0
此内容尚无中文(中国)版本。在发布译文之前以英语显示。
On the internet, routes are announced as prefixes: an autonomous system tells its neighbours via BGP that it can deliver traffic for, say, 144.122.0.0/16 (Middle East Technical University, AS1967). This tool looks a prefix up in our daily copy of the global routing table and shows three things:
- Exact announcements: which AS originates exactly this prefix. More than one origin (a MOAS) is normal for anycast services and some multihomed networks, and suspicious otherwise.
- Covering routes: less-specific announcements that contain it. Traffic follows the most specific route, so a covering route matters if the more-specific one disappears.
- More-specifics: announcements inside it, which may belong to other networks (customers, or a hijack).
Each announced route is also checked against the RPKI: whether a ROA authorises its origin AS.
The table is the view from APNIC’s route collector. Most of the global table is the same from everywhere, but a route that is filtered before it reaches that collector will not appear.
常见问题
Why is my /24 not listed but a /16 is?
Your addresses are announced as part of the larger block, and no one announces the /24 separately. That is the normal case for most customers of a provider.
What is a more-specific hijack?
Someone announces a longer prefix inside your space. Because routers prefer the most specific route, traffic goes to them. RPKI with a strict max length makes such announcements invalid.
Can I enter a single address?
Yes. The tool then shows the most specific announced route that contains it.