BGP 前缀查询
输入一个前缀(或单个地址)。由我们每日复制的全球路由表回答。
113.12.0.0/14
精确宣告
- 113.12.0.0/14AS4134No.31,Jin-rong StreetRPKI 有效113.12.0.0
- 注册机构
- APNIC · 中国 · 2008年9月18日
- 分配的地址块
- 113.12.0.0 – 113.15.255.255
覆盖路由
没有较不具体的路由覆盖它。
更具体的路由
- 113.12.69.0/24AS4134No.31,Jin-rong StreetRPKI 有效113.12.69.0
- 113.12.80.0/22AS138169China TelecomRPKI 有效113.12.80.0
- 113.12.84.0/24AS138169China TelecomRPKI 有效113.12.84.0
- 113.13.16.0/23AS138169China TelecomRPKI 有效113.13.16.0
- 113.13.18.0/24AS137693CHINATELECOM Guangxi Nanning IDC networkdescr: Nanning , Guangxi Province, P.R.China.RPKI 有效113.13.18.0
- 113.13.19.0/24AS137693CHINATELECOM Guangxi Nanning IDC networkdescr: Nanning , Guangxi Province, P.R.China.RPKI 有效113.13.19.0
- 113.14.96.0/24AS137693CHINATELECOM Guangxi Nanning IDC networkdescr: Nanning , Guangxi Province, P.R.China.RPKI 有效113.14.96.0
- 113.14.97.0/24AS137693CHINATELECOM Guangxi Nanning IDC networkdescr: Nanning , Guangxi Province, P.R.China.RPKI 有效113.14.97.0
- 113.14.98.0/24AS137693CHINATELECOM Guangxi Nanning IDC networkdescr: Nanning , Guangxi Province, P.R.China.RPKI 有效113.14.98.0
- 113.14.100.0/22AS134419BeihaiRPKI 有效113.14.100.0
- 113.14.104.0/21AS134419BeihaiRPKI 有效113.14.104.0
- 113.14.112.0/20AS134419BeihaiRPKI 有效113.14.112.0
- 113.14.208.0/21AS134419BeihaiRPKI 有效113.14.208.0
- 113.15.57.0/24AS137693CHINATELECOM Guangxi Nanning IDC networkdescr: Nanning , Guangxi Province, P.R.China.RPKI 有效113.15.57.0
- 113.15.160.0/19AS134419BeihaiRPKI 有效113.15.160.0
- 113.15.163.0/24AS134419BeihaiRPKI 有效113.15.163.0
此内容尚无中文(中国)版本。在发布译文之前以英语显示。
On the internet, routes are announced as prefixes: an autonomous system tells its neighbours via BGP that it can deliver traffic for, say, 144.122.0.0/16 (Middle East Technical University, AS1967). This tool looks a prefix up in our daily copy of the global routing table and shows three things:
- Exact announcements: which AS originates exactly this prefix. More than one origin (a MOAS) is normal for anycast services and some multihomed networks, and suspicious otherwise.
- Covering routes: less-specific announcements that contain it. Traffic follows the most specific route, so a covering route matters if the more-specific one disappears.
- More-specifics: announcements inside it, which may belong to other networks (customers, or a hijack).
Each announced route is also checked against the RPKI: whether a ROA authorises its origin AS.
The table is the view from APNIC’s route collector. Most of the global table is the same from everywhere, but a route that is filtered before it reaches that collector will not appear.
常见问题
Why is my /24 not listed but a /16 is?
Your addresses are announced as part of the larger block, and no one announces the /24 separately. That is the normal case for most customers of a provider.
What is a more-specific hijack?
Someone announces a longer prefix inside your space. Because routers prefer the most specific route, traffic goes to them. RPKI with a strict max length makes such announcements invalid.
Can I enter a single address?
Yes. The tool then shows the most specific announced route that contains it.