BGP 前缀查询
输入一个前缀(或单个地址)。由我们每日复制的全球路由表回答。
115.168.0.0/14
精确宣告
- 115.168.0.0/14AS4134No.31,Jin-rong StreetRPKI 无 ROA115.168.0.0
- 注册机构
- APNIC · 中国 · 2008年8月25日
- 分配的地址块
- 115.168.0.0 – 115.171.255.255
覆盖路由
没有较不具体的路由覆盖它。
更具体的路由
- 115.168.1.0/24AS4847China Networks Inter-ExchangeRPKI 有效115.168.1.0
- 115.168.37.0/24AS17799asn for Liaoning Provincial Net of CTRPKI 有效115.168.37.0
- 115.168.64.0/24AS4847China Networks Inter-ExchangeRPKI 有效115.168.64.0
- 115.168.69.0/24AS17799asn for Liaoning Provincial Net of CTRPKI 有效115.168.69.0
- 115.169.4.0/23AS58518China TelecomRPKI 无 ROA115.169.4.0
- 115.169.11.0/24AS58517China TelecomRPKI 无 ROA115.169.11.0
- 115.169.12.0/24AS58517China TelecomRPKI 无 ROA115.169.12.0
- 115.169.13.0/24AS58517China TelecomRPKI 无 ROA115.169.13.0
- 115.169.32.0/24AS4809China Telecom Next Generation Carrier NetworkRPKI 有效115.169.32.0
- 115.169.36.0/24AS58518China TelecomRPKI 无 ROA115.169.36.0
- 115.169.37.0/24AS58518China TelecomRPKI 无 ROA115.169.37.0
- 115.169.38.0/24AS58518China TelecomRPKI 无 ROA115.169.38.0
- 115.169.39.0/24AS4809China Telecom Next Generation Carrier NetworkRPKI 有效115.169.39.0
- 115.169.40.0/24AS4809China Telecom Next Generation Carrier NetworkRPKI 有效115.169.40.0
- 115.169.253.0/24AS4134No.31,Jin-rong StreetRPKI 有效115.169.253.0
- 115.170.132.0/24AS137689IOT Jiangsu network, Chinatelecom, P.R.China.RPKI 有效115.170.132.0
- 115.170.133.0/24AS137689IOT Jiangsu network, Chinatelecom, P.R.China.RPKI 有效115.170.133.0
- 115.170.165.0/24AS137692IOT Guangdong network, Chinatelecom, P.R.China.RPKI 有效115.170.165.0
- 115.170.166.0/24AS137692IOT Guangdong network, Chinatelecom, P.R.China.RPKI 有效115.170.166.0
- 115.170.169.0/24AS137692IOT Guangdong network, Chinatelecom, P.R.China.RPKI 有效115.170.169.0
- 115.170.218.0/24AS140636China TelecomRPKI 有效115.170.218.0
- 115.170.219.0/24AS140636China TelecomRPKI 有效115.170.219.0
- 115.170.234.0/24AS137692IOT Guangdong network, Chinatelecom, P.R.China.RPKI 有效115.170.234.0
- 115.170.235.0/24AS137692IOT Guangdong network, Chinatelecom, P.R.China.RPKI 有效115.170.235.0
- 115.171.0.0/16AS4847China Networks Inter-ExchangeRPKI 有效115.171.0.0
- 115.171.0.0/18AS4847China Networks Inter-ExchangeRPKI 有效115.171.0.0
- 115.171.64.0/18AS4847China Networks Inter-ExchangeRPKI 有效115.171.64.0
- 115.171.128.0/18AS4847China Networks Inter-ExchangeRPKI 有效115.171.128.0
- 115.171.192.0/18AS4847China Networks Inter-ExchangeRPKI 有效115.171.192.0
此内容尚无中文(中国)版本。在发布译文之前以英语显示。
On the internet, routes are announced as prefixes: an autonomous system tells its neighbours via BGP that it can deliver traffic for, say, 144.122.0.0/16 (Middle East Technical University, AS1967). This tool looks a prefix up in our daily copy of the global routing table and shows three things:
- Exact announcements: which AS originates exactly this prefix. More than one origin (a MOAS) is normal for anycast services and some multihomed networks, and suspicious otherwise.
- Covering routes: less-specific announcements that contain it. Traffic follows the most specific route, so a covering route matters if the more-specific one disappears.
- More-specifics: announcements inside it, which may belong to other networks (customers, or a hijack).
Each announced route is also checked against the RPKI: whether a ROA authorises its origin AS.
The table is the view from APNIC’s route collector. Most of the global table is the same from everywhere, but a route that is filtered before it reaches that collector will not appear.
常见问题
Why is my /24 not listed but a /16 is?
Your addresses are announced as part of the larger block, and no one announces the /24 separately. That is the normal case for most customers of a provider.
What is a more-specific hijack?
Someone announces a longer prefix inside your space. Because routers prefer the most specific route, traffic goes to them. RPKI with a strict max length makes such announcements invalid.
Can I enter a single address?
Yes. The tool then shows the most specific announced route that contains it.