BGP 前缀查询
输入一个前缀(或单个地址)。由我们每日复制的全球路由表回答。
116.8.0.0/14
精确宣告
- 116.8.0.0/14AS4134No.31,Jin-rong StreetRPKI 有效116.8.0.0
- 注册机构
- APNIC · 中国 · 2007年3月22日
- 分配的地址块
- 116.8.0.0 – 116.11.255.255
覆盖路由
没有较不具体的路由覆盖它。
更具体的路由
- 116.8.0.0/19AS4809China Telecom Next Generation Carrier NetworkRPKI 有效116.8.0.0
- 116.8.104.0/24AS137693CHINATELECOM Guangxi Nanning IDC networkdescr: Nanning , Guangxi Province, P.R.China.RPKI 有效116.8.104.0
- 116.8.105.0/24AS137693CHINATELECOM Guangxi Nanning IDC networkdescr: Nanning , Guangxi Province, P.R.China.RPKI 有效116.8.105.0
- 116.8.106.0/24AS137693CHINATELECOM Guangxi Nanning IDC networkdescr: Nanning , Guangxi Province, P.R.China.RPKI 有效116.8.106.0
- 116.8.107.0/24AS137693CHINATELECOM Guangxi Nanning IDC networkdescr: Nanning , Guangxi Province, P.R.China.RPKI 有效116.8.107.0
- 116.8.108.0/24AS137693CHINATELECOM Guangxi Nanning IDC networkdescr: Nanning , Guangxi Province, P.R.China.RPKI 有效116.8.108.0
- 116.8.109.0/24AS137693CHINATELECOM Guangxi Nanning IDC networkdescr: Nanning , Guangxi Province, P.R.China.RPKI 有效116.8.109.0
- 116.8.116.0/24AS138169China TelecomRPKI 有效116.8.116.0
- 116.8.117.0/24AS137693CHINATELECOM Guangxi Nanning IDC networkdescr: Nanning , Guangxi Province, P.R.China.RPKI 有效116.8.117.0
- 116.8.118.0/24AS137693CHINATELECOM Guangxi Nanning IDC networkdescr: Nanning , Guangxi Province, P.R.China.RPKI 有效116.8.118.0
- 116.8.119.0/24AS138169China TelecomRPKI 有效116.8.119.0
- 116.8.130.0/23AS138991China TelecomRPKI 有效116.8.130.0
- 116.8.132.0/23AS138991China TelecomRPKI 有效116.8.132.0
- 116.10.48.0/20AS134419BeihaiRPKI 有效116.10.48.0
- 116.10.64.0/20AS134419BeihaiRPKI 有效116.10.64.0
- 116.10.125.0/24AS138169China TelecomRPKI 有效116.10.125.0
- 116.10.184.0/24AS138169China TelecomRPKI 有效116.10.184.0
- 116.10.185.0/24AS138169China TelecomRPKI 有效116.10.185.0
- 116.10.186.0/24AS138169China TelecomRPKI 有效116.10.186.0
- 116.10.187.0/24AS138169China TelecomRPKI 有效116.10.187.0
- 116.10.188.0/24AS138169China TelecomRPKI 有效116.10.188.0
- 116.10.189.0/24AS138169China TelecomRPKI 有效116.10.189.0
- 116.10.190.0/24AS138169China TelecomRPKI 有效116.10.190.0
- 116.10.191.0/24AS138169China TelecomRPKI 有效116.10.191.0
- 116.11.0.0/19AS134419BeihaiRPKI 有效116.11.0.0
- 116.11.32.0/22AS134419BeihaiRPKI 有效116.11.32.0
- 116.11.32.0/24AS134419BeihaiRPKI 有效116.11.32.0
- 116.11.120.0/21AS138991China TelecomRPKI 有效116.11.120.0
- 116.11.120.0/24AS138991China TelecomRPKI 有效116.11.120.0
- 116.11.248.0/24AS138991China TelecomRPKI 有效116.11.248.0
- 116.11.252.0/23AS138169China TelecomRPKI 有效116.11.252.0
- 116.11.254.0/24AS138169China TelecomRPKI 有效116.11.254.0
- 116.11.255.0/24AS138169China TelecomRPKI 有效116.11.255.0
此内容尚无中文(中国)版本。在发布译文之前以英语显示。
On the internet, routes are announced as prefixes: an autonomous system tells its neighbours via BGP that it can deliver traffic for, say, 144.122.0.0/16 (Middle East Technical University, AS1967). This tool looks a prefix up in our daily copy of the global routing table and shows three things:
- Exact announcements: which AS originates exactly this prefix. More than one origin (a MOAS) is normal for anycast services and some multihomed networks, and suspicious otherwise.
- Covering routes: less-specific announcements that contain it. Traffic follows the most specific route, so a covering route matters if the more-specific one disappears.
- More-specifics: announcements inside it, which may belong to other networks (customers, or a hijack).
Each announced route is also checked against the RPKI: whether a ROA authorises its origin AS.
The table is the view from APNIC’s route collector. Most of the global table is the same from everywhere, but a route that is filtered before it reaches that collector will not appear.
常见问题
Why is my /24 not listed but a /16 is?
Your addresses are announced as part of the larger block, and no one announces the /24 separately. That is the normal case for most customers of a provider.
What is a more-specific hijack?
Someone announces a longer prefix inside your space. Because routers prefer the most specific route, traffic goes to them. RPKI with a strict max length makes such announcements invalid.
Can I enter a single address?
Yes. The tool then shows the most specific announced route that contains it.