BGP 前缀查询
输入一个前缀(或单个地址)。由我们每日复制的全球路由表回答。
159.18.0.0/16
精确宣告
- 159.18.0.0/16AS6461Zayo BandwidthRPKI 有效159.18.0.0
- 注册机构
- ARIN · 美国 · 1992年2月27日
- 分配的地址块
- 159.18.0.0 – 159.18.255.255
覆盖路由
没有较不具体的路由覆盖它。
更具体的路由
- 159.18.19.0/24AS6401Zayo BandwidthRPKI 有效159.18.19.0
- 159.18.21.0/24AS22863NBS Payment Solutions Inc.RPKI 有效159.18.21.0
- 159.18.26.0/24AS20045Toronto Hydro Electric System LimitedRPKI 有效159.18.26.0
- 159.18.53.0/24AS18563CGI Inc.RPKI 有效159.18.53.0
- 159.18.69.0/24AS812Rogers Communications Canada Inc.RPKI 有效159.18.69.0
- 159.18.94.0/24AS25797Teranet Inc.RPKI 有效159.18.94.0
- 159.18.95.0/24AS11628Ontario Institute for Cancer ResearchRPKI 有效159.18.95.0
- 159.18.103.0/24AS25797Teranet Inc.RPKI 有效159.18.103.0
- 159.18.129.0/24AS46129THE CADILLAC FAIRVIEW CORPORATION LIMITED/LA CORPORATION CADILLAC FAIRVIEW LIMITEERPKI 有效159.18.129.0
- 159.18.131.0/24AS46129THE CADILLAC FAIRVIEW CORPORATION LIMITED/LA CORPORATION CADILLAC FAIRVIEW LIMITEERPKI 有效159.18.131.0
- 159.18.145.0/24AS54085Economical InsuranceRPKI 有效159.18.145.0
- 159.18.151.0/24AS21774The Exchange Global Server CenterRPKI 有效159.18.151.0
- 159.18.175.0/24AS40560Dynacare-Gamma Laboratories PartnershipRPKI 有效159.18.175.0
- 159.18.178.0/24AS21774The Exchange Global Server CenterRPKI 有效159.18.178.0
- 159.18.184.0/24AS54085Economical InsuranceRPKI 有效159.18.184.0
- 159.18.185.0/24AS29731ING Bank of CanadaRPKI 有效159.18.185.0
- 159.18.190.0/24AS54719TELUS Communications Inc.RPKI 有效159.18.190.0
- 159.18.195.0/24AS29731ING Bank of CanadaRPKI 有效159.18.195.0
- 159.18.216.0/24AS29731ING Bank of CanadaRPKI 有效159.18.216.0
- 159.18.217.0/24AS29731ING Bank of CanadaRPKI 有效159.18.217.0
- 159.18.220.0/23AS18563CGI Inc.RPKI 有效159.18.220.0
- 159.18.246.0/24AS40560Dynacare-Gamma Laboratories PartnershipRPKI 有效159.18.246.0
- 159.18.249.0/24AS17025Zayo BandwidthRPKI 有效159.18.249.0
- 159.18.250.0/24AS17025Zayo BandwidthRPKI 有效159.18.250.0
此内容尚无中文(中国)版本。在发布译文之前以英语显示。
On the internet, routes are announced as prefixes: an autonomous system tells its neighbours via BGP that it can deliver traffic for, say, 144.122.0.0/16 (Middle East Technical University, AS1967). This tool looks a prefix up in our daily copy of the global routing table and shows three things:
- Exact announcements: which AS originates exactly this prefix. More than one origin (a MOAS) is normal for anycast services and some multihomed networks, and suspicious otherwise.
- Covering routes: less-specific announcements that contain it. Traffic follows the most specific route, so a covering route matters if the more-specific one disappears.
- More-specifics: announcements inside it, which may belong to other networks (customers, or a hijack).
Each announced route is also checked against the RPKI: whether a ROA authorises its origin AS.
The table is the view from APNIC’s route collector. Most of the global table is the same from everywhere, but a route that is filtered before it reaches that collector will not appear.
常见问题
Why is my /24 not listed but a /16 is?
Your addresses are announced as part of the larger block, and no one announces the /24 separately. That is the normal case for most customers of a provider.
What is a more-specific hijack?
Someone announces a longer prefix inside your space. Because routers prefer the most specific route, traffic goes to them. RPKI with a strict max length makes such announcements invalid.
Can I enter a single address?
Yes. The tool then shows the most specific announced route that contains it.