BGP 前缀查询
输入一个前缀(或单个地址)。由我们每日复制的全球路由表回答。
210.103.0.0/17
精确宣告
- 210.103.0.0/17AS4766Korea TelecomRPKI 无 ROA210.103.0.0
- 注册机构
- APNIC · 韩国 · 1997年12月6日
- 分配的地址块
- 210.103.0.0 – 210.103.127.255
覆盖路由
没有较不具体的路由覆盖它。
更具体的路由
- 210.103.15.0/24AS4766Korea TelecomRPKI 无 ROA210.103.15.0
- 210.103.16.0/23AS4766Korea TelecomRPKI 无 ROA210.103.16.0
- 210.103.25.0/24AS18333at(Korea Argo-Fisheries Food Trade Corporation)RPKI 无 ROA210.103.25.0
- 210.103.52.128/25AS45400Korea TelecomRPKI 无 ROA210.103.52.128
- 210.103.53.0/24AS18323Seoul National University Bundang HospitalRPKI 无 ROA210.103.53.0
- 210.103.55.0/24AS45400Korea TelecomRPKI 无 ROA210.103.55.0
- 210.103.57.0/24AS18323Seoul National University Bundang HospitalRPKI 无 ROA210.103.57.0
- 210.103.63.0/24AS17841NATIONAL INFORMATION RESOURCES SERVICERPKI 无 ROA210.103.63.0
- 210.103.72.0/24AS17841NATIONAL INFORMATION RESOURCES SERVICERPKI 无 ROA210.103.72.0
- 210.103.72.0/25AS17841NATIONAL INFORMATION RESOURCES SERVICERPKI 无 ROA210.103.72.0
- 210.103.72.128/25AS17841NATIONAL INFORMATION RESOURCES SERVICERPKI 无 ROA210.103.72.128
- 210.103.81.0/24AS17841NATIONAL INFORMATION RESOURCES SERVICERPKI 无 ROA210.103.81.0
- 210.103.82.0/24AS17841NATIONAL INFORMATION RESOURCES SERVICERPKI 无 ROA210.103.82.0
- 210.103.83.0/24AS17841NATIONAL INFORMATION RESOURCES SERVICERPKI 无 ROA210.103.83.0
- 210.103.111.0/24AS45400Korea TelecomRPKI 无 ROA210.103.111.0
- 210.103.115.0/24AS45400Korea TelecomRPKI 无 ROA210.103.115.0
- 210.103.115.0/25AS45400Korea TelecomRPKI 无 ROA210.103.115.0
- 210.103.115.128/25AS45400Korea TelecomRPKI 无 ROA210.103.115.128
- 210.103.121.0/25AS4766Korea TelecomRPKI 无 ROA210.103.121.0
- 210.103.121.128/25AS4766Korea TelecomRPKI 无 ROA210.103.121.128
此内容尚无中文(中国)版本。在发布译文之前以英语显示。
On the internet, routes are announced as prefixes: an autonomous system tells its neighbours via BGP that it can deliver traffic for, say, 144.122.0.0/16 (Middle East Technical University, AS1967). This tool looks a prefix up in our daily copy of the global routing table and shows three things:
- Exact announcements: which AS originates exactly this prefix. More than one origin (a MOAS) is normal for anycast services and some multihomed networks, and suspicious otherwise.
- Covering routes: less-specific announcements that contain it. Traffic follows the most specific route, so a covering route matters if the more-specific one disappears.
- More-specifics: announcements inside it, which may belong to other networks (customers, or a hijack).
Each announced route is also checked against the RPKI: whether a ROA authorises its origin AS.
The table is the view from APNIC’s route collector. Most of the global table is the same from everywhere, but a route that is filtered before it reaches that collector will not appear.
常见问题
Why is my /24 not listed but a /16 is?
Your addresses are announced as part of the larger block, and no one announces the /24 separately. That is the normal case for most customers of a provider.
What is a more-specific hijack?
Someone announces a longer prefix inside your space. Because routers prefer the most specific route, traffic goes to them. RPKI with a strict max length makes such announcements invalid.
Can I enter a single address?
Yes. The tool then shows the most specific announced route that contains it.