BGP 前缀查询
输入一个前缀(或单个地址)。由我们每日复制的全球路由表回答。
220.80.0.0/13
精确宣告
- 220.80.0.0/13AS4766Korea TelecomRPKI 无 ROA220.80.0.0
- 注册机构
- APNIC · 韩国 · 2002年8月29日
- 分配的地址块
- 220.80.0.0 – 220.87.255.255
覆盖路由
没有较不具体的路由覆盖它。
更具体的路由
- 220.80.112.0/22AS4766Korea TelecomRPKI 无 ROA220.80.112.0
- 220.81.64.0/24AS4766Korea TelecomRPKI 无 ROA220.81.64.0
- 220.81.65.0/24AS4766Korea TelecomRPKI 无 ROA220.81.65.0
- 220.81.66.0/24AS4766Korea TelecomRPKI 无 ROA220.81.66.0
- 220.81.92.0/22AS4766Korea TelecomRPKI 无 ROA220.81.92.0
- 220.81.195.0/24AS9523Mokwon UniversityRPKI 无 ROA220.81.195.0
- 220.81.196.0/22AS9523Mokwon UniversityRPKI 无 ROA220.81.196.0
- 220.82.0.0/21AS18035HANSEO UNIVERSITYRPKI 无 ROA220.82.0.0
- 220.83.15.0/24AS38422Seowon UniversityRPKI 无 ROA220.83.15.0
- 220.83.16.0/24AS38422Seowon UniversityRPKI 无 ROA220.83.16.0
- 220.83.32.0/24AS4766Korea TelecomRPKI 无 ROA220.83.32.0
- 220.83.33.0/24AS4766Korea TelecomRPKI 无 ROA220.83.33.0
- 220.83.34.0/24AS4766Korea TelecomRPKI 无 ROA220.83.34.0
- 220.83.35.0/24AS4766Korea TelecomRPKI 无 ROA220.83.35.0
- 220.83.46.0/24AS4766Korea TelecomRPKI 无 ROA220.83.46.0
- 220.83.47.0/24AS4766Korea TelecomRPKI 无 ROA220.83.47.0
- 220.83.92.0/24AS4766Korea TelecomRPKI 无 ROA220.83.92.0
- 220.83.125.128/25AS4766Korea TelecomRPKI 无 ROA220.83.125.128
- 220.83.156.0/24AS55615DOUZONEBIZONRPKI 无 ROA220.83.156.0
- 220.83.157.0/24AS55615DOUZONEBIZONRPKI 无 ROA220.83.157.0
- 220.83.237.0/24AS17856Konyang UniversityRPKI 无 ROA220.83.237.0
- 220.85.44.0/24AS45409KBCAPITALRPKI 无 ROA220.85.44.0
- 220.85.223.0/24AS9778DAEJIN UNIVERSITYRPKI 无 ROA220.85.223.0
- 220.86.242.0/24AS4766Korea TelecomRPKI 无 ROA220.86.242.0
- 220.86.243.0/24AS4766Korea TelecomRPKI 无 ROA220.86.243.0
- 220.86.244.0/24AS4766Korea TelecomRPKI 无 ROA220.86.244.0
- 220.86.245.0/24AS4766Korea TelecomRPKI 无 ROA220.86.245.0
- 220.87.44.0/24AS9840INSPIRE Integrated ResortRPKI 无 ROA220.87.44.0
- 220.87.124.0/24AS4766Korea TelecomRPKI 无 ROA220.87.124.0
此内容尚无中文(中国)版本。在发布译文之前以英语显示。
On the internet, routes are announced as prefixes: an autonomous system tells its neighbours via BGP that it can deliver traffic for, say, 144.122.0.0/16 (Middle East Technical University, AS1967). This tool looks a prefix up in our daily copy of the global routing table and shows three things:
- Exact announcements: which AS originates exactly this prefix. More than one origin (a MOAS) is normal for anycast services and some multihomed networks, and suspicious otherwise.
- Covering routes: less-specific announcements that contain it. Traffic follows the most specific route, so a covering route matters if the more-specific one disappears.
- More-specifics: announcements inside it, which may belong to other networks (customers, or a hijack).
Each announced route is also checked against the RPKI: whether a ROA authorises its origin AS.
The table is the view from APNIC’s route collector. Most of the global table is the same from everywhere, but a route that is filtered before it reaches that collector will not appear.
常见问题
Why is my /24 not listed but a /16 is?
Your addresses are announced as part of the larger block, and no one announces the /24 separately. That is the normal case for most customers of a provider.
What is a more-specific hijack?
Someone announces a longer prefix inside your space. Because routers prefer the most specific route, traffic goes to them. RPKI with a strict max length makes such announcements invalid.
Can I enter a single address?
Yes. The tool then shows the most specific announced route that contains it.