BGP 前缀查询
输入一个前缀(或单个地址)。由我们每日复制的全球路由表回答。
221.160.0.0/13
精确宣告
- 221.160.0.0/13AS4766Korea TelecomRPKI 无 ROA221.160.0.0
- 注册机构
- APNIC · 韩国 · 2003年4月17日
- 分配的地址块
- 221.160.0.0 – 221.167.255.255
覆盖路由
没有较不具体的路由覆盖它。
更具体的路由
- 221.160.30.0/24AS4766Korea TelecomRPKI 无 ROA221.160.30.0
- 221.160.143.0/24AS4766Korea TelecomRPKI 无 ROA221.160.143.0
- 221.160.151.0/24AS38422Seowon UniversityRPKI 无 ROA221.160.151.0
- 221.160.178.0/24AS4766Korea TelecomRPKI 无 ROA221.160.178.0
- 221.160.179.0/25AS4766Korea TelecomRPKI 无 ROA221.160.179.0
- 221.160.183.0/24AS38422Seowon UniversityRPKI 无 ROA221.160.183.0
- 221.160.197.0/24AS4766Korea TelecomRPKI 无 ROA221.160.197.0
- 221.161.97.0/25AS23562BUSAN CITY ENVIRONMENTAL INSTALLATIONS CORPRPKI 无 ROA221.161.97.0
- 221.161.97.128/25AS23562BUSAN CITY ENVIRONMENTAL INSTALLATIONS CORPRPKI 无 ROA221.161.97.128
- 221.162.24.0/24AS45377Jeju Special Self Governing Provincial office of EducationRPKI 无 ROA221.162.24.0
- 221.162.86.0/24AS4766Korea TelecomRPKI 无 ROA221.162.86.0
- 221.163.32.0/24AS18323Seoul National University Bundang HospitalRPKI 无 ROA221.163.32.0
- 221.164.0.0/24AS9631youngsan universityRPKI 无 ROA221.164.0.0
- 221.164.1.0/24AS9631youngsan universityRPKI 无 ROA221.164.1.0
- 221.164.2.0/24AS9631youngsan universityRPKI 无 ROA221.164.2.0
- 221.164.3.0/24AS9631youngsan universityRPKI 无 ROA221.164.3.0
- 221.164.5.0/24AS9631youngsan universityRPKI 无 ROA221.164.5.0
- 221.164.9.0/24AS131101BNK SYSTEMRPKI 无 ROA221.164.9.0
- 221.164.68.0/24AS9631youngsan universityRPKI 无 ROA221.164.68.0
- 221.164.69.0/24AS9631youngsan universityRPKI 无 ROA221.164.69.0
- 221.164.70.0/24AS9631youngsan universityRPKI 无 ROA221.164.70.0
- 221.164.71.0/24AS9631youngsan universityRPKI 无 ROA221.164.71.0
- 221.165.26.0/24AS4766Korea TelecomRPKI 无 ROA221.165.26.0
- 221.165.31.0/24AS9862GORayNetRPKI 无 ROA221.165.31.0
此内容尚无中文(中国)版本。在发布译文之前以英语显示。
On the internet, routes are announced as prefixes: an autonomous system tells its neighbours via BGP that it can deliver traffic for, say, 144.122.0.0/16 (Middle East Technical University, AS1967). This tool looks a prefix up in our daily copy of the global routing table and shows three things:
- Exact announcements: which AS originates exactly this prefix. More than one origin (a MOAS) is normal for anycast services and some multihomed networks, and suspicious otherwise.
- Covering routes: less-specific announcements that contain it. Traffic follows the most specific route, so a covering route matters if the more-specific one disappears.
- More-specifics: announcements inside it, which may belong to other networks (customers, or a hijack).
Each announced route is also checked against the RPKI: whether a ROA authorises its origin AS.
The table is the view from APNIC’s route collector. Most of the global table is the same from everywhere, but a route that is filtered before it reaches that collector will not appear.
常见问题
Why is my /24 not listed but a /16 is?
Your addresses are announced as part of the larger block, and no one announces the /24 separately. That is the normal case for most customers of a provider.
What is a more-specific hijack?
Someone announces a longer prefix inside your space. Because routers prefer the most specific route, traffic goes to them. RPKI with a strict max length makes such announcements invalid.
Can I enter a single address?
Yes. The tool then shows the most specific announced route that contains it.