BGP 前缀查询
输入一个前缀(或单个地址)。由我们每日复制的全球路由表回答。
2607:f3a0::/32
精确宣告
- 2607:f3a0::/32AS23342Unitedlayer, Inc.RPKI 无 ROA2607:f3a0::
- 注册机构
- ARIN · 美国 · 2008年3月19日
- 分配的地址块
- 2607:f3a0:: – 2607:f3a0:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff
覆盖路由
没有较不具体的路由覆盖它。
更具体的路由
- 2607:f3a0::/35AS23342Unitedlayer, Inc.RPKI 无 ROA2607:f3a0::
- 2607:f3a0:1000::/48AS23342Unitedlayer, Inc.RPKI 无 ROA2607:f3a0:1000::
- 2607:f3a0:1013::/48AS23342Unitedlayer, Inc.RPKI 无 ROA2607:f3a0:1013::
- 2607:f3a0:2000::/35AS40061UnitedLayer, LLCRPKI 无 ROA2607:f3a0:2000::
- 2607:f3a0:a000::/48AS399808UnitedLayer, LLCRPKI 有效2607:f3a0:a000::
- 2607:f3a0:a001::/48AS399819UnitedLayer, LLCRPKI 有效2607:f3a0:a001::
- 2607:f3a0:a002::/48AS399817UnitedLayer, LLCRPKI 有效2607:f3a0:a002::
- 2607:f3a0:a003::/48AS399818UnitedLayer, LLCRPKI 有效2607:f3a0:a003::
- 2607:f3a0:a004::/48AS399816UnitedLayer, LLCRPKI 有效2607:f3a0:a004::
- 2607:f3a0:a005::/48AS399815UnitedLayer, LLCRPKI 有效2607:f3a0:a005::
- 2607:f3a0:a006::/48AS399814UnitedLayer, LLCRPKI 有效2607:f3a0:a006::
- 2607:f3a0:a007::/48AS399813UnitedLayer, LLCRPKI 有效2607:f3a0:a007::
- 2607:f3a0:a008::/48AS399812UnitedLayer, LLCRPKI 有效2607:f3a0:a008::
- 2607:f3a0:a009::/48AS399810UnitedLayer, LLCRPKI 有效2607:f3a0:a009::
- 2607:f3a0:a00a::/48AS399809UnitedLayer, LLCRPKI 有效2607:f3a0:a00a::
- 2607:f3a0:a00c::/48AS62815UnitedLayer, LLCRPKI 有效2607:f3a0:a00c::
此内容尚无中文(中国)版本。在发布译文之前以英语显示。
On the internet, routes are announced as prefixes: an autonomous system tells its neighbours via BGP that it can deliver traffic for, say, 144.122.0.0/16 (Middle East Technical University, AS1967). This tool looks a prefix up in our daily copy of the global routing table and shows three things:
- Exact announcements: which AS originates exactly this prefix. More than one origin (a MOAS) is normal for anycast services and some multihomed networks, and suspicious otherwise.
- Covering routes: less-specific announcements that contain it. Traffic follows the most specific route, so a covering route matters if the more-specific one disappears.
- More-specifics: announcements inside it, which may belong to other networks (customers, or a hijack).
Each announced route is also checked against the RPKI: whether a ROA authorises its origin AS.
The table is the view from APNIC’s route collector. Most of the global table is the same from everywhere, but a route that is filtered before it reaches that collector will not appear.
常见问题
Why is my /24 not listed but a /16 is?
Your addresses are announced as part of the larger block, and no one announces the /24 separately. That is the normal case for most customers of a provider.
What is a more-specific hijack?
Someone announces a longer prefix inside your space. Because routers prefer the most specific route, traffic goes to them. RPKI with a strict max length makes such announcements invalid.
Can I enter a single address?
Yes. The tool then shows the most specific announced route that contains it.