BGP-prefix opzoeken
Voer een prefix (of één adres) in. Beantwoord uit onze dagelijkse kopie van de wereldwijde routeringstabel.
2001:c38:9200::/40
Exact aangekondigd
- 2001:c38:9200::/40AS9931National Telecom Public Company LimitedRPKI Geldig2001:c38:9200::
- Register
- APNIC · Thailand · 7 aug 2002
- Toegewezen blok
- 2001:c38:: – 2001:c38:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff
Overkoepelende routes
- 2001:c38:9000::/36AS9931National Telecom Public Company LimitedRPKI Geldig2001:c38:9000::
Specifiekere routes
- 2001:c38:9201::/48AS9931National Telecom Public Company LimitedRPKI Geldig2001:c38:9201::
- 2001:c38:9202::/48AS9931National Telecom Public Company LimitedRPKI Geldig2001:c38:9202::
- 2001:c38:9203::/48AS9931National Telecom Public Company LimitedRPKI Geldig2001:c38:9203::
- 2001:c38:9204::/48AS9931National Telecom Public Company LimitedRPKI Geldig2001:c38:9204::
- 2001:c38:9205::/48AS9931National Telecom Public Company LimitedRPKI Geldig2001:c38:9205::
- 2001:c38:9206::/48AS9931National Telecom Public Company LimitedRPKI Geldig2001:c38:9206::
- 2001:c38:9208::/48AS9931National Telecom Public Company LimitedRPKI Geldig2001:c38:9208::
- 2001:c38:920a::/48AS9931National Telecom Public Company LimitedRPKI Geldig2001:c38:920a::
- 2001:c38:920f::/48AS9931National Telecom Public Company LimitedRPKI Geldig2001:c38:920f::
- 2001:c38:9210::/48AS9931National Telecom Public Company LimitedRPKI Geldig2001:c38:9210::
- 2001:c38:9211::/48AS9931National Telecom Public Company LimitedRPKI Geldig2001:c38:9211::
- 2001:c38:9212::/48AS9931National Telecom Public Company LimitedRPKI Geldig2001:c38:9212::
- 2001:c38:9213::/48AS9931National Telecom Public Company LimitedRPKI Geldig2001:c38:9213::
- 2001:c38:9220::/48AS9931National Telecom Public Company LimitedRPKI Geldig2001:c38:9220::
Deze tekst is nog niet beschikbaar in het Nederlands. Hij wordt in het Engels getoond tot er een vertaling is gepubliceerd.
On the internet, routes are announced as prefixes: an autonomous system tells its neighbours via BGP that it can deliver traffic for, say, 144.122.0.0/16 (Middle East Technical University, AS1967). This tool looks a prefix up in our daily copy of the global routing table and shows three things:
- Exact announcements: which AS originates exactly this prefix. More than one origin (a MOAS) is normal for anycast services and some multihomed networks, and suspicious otherwise.
- Covering routes: less-specific announcements that contain it. Traffic follows the most specific route, so a covering route matters if the more-specific one disappears.
- More-specifics: announcements inside it, which may belong to other networks (customers, or a hijack).
Each announced route is also checked against the RPKI: whether a ROA authorises its origin AS.
The table is the view from APNIC’s route collector. Most of the global table is the same from everywhere, but a route that is filtered before it reaches that collector will not appear.
Veelgestelde vragen
Why is my /24 not listed but a /16 is?
Your addresses are announced as part of the larger block, and no one announces the /24 separately. That is the normal case for most customers of a provider.
What is a more-specific hijack?
Someone announces a longer prefix inside your space. Because routers prefer the most specific route, traffic goes to them. RPKI with a strict max length makes such announcements invalid.
Can I enter a single address?
Yes. The tool then shows the most specific announced route that contains it.